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Abstract 
This thesis presents Zen experience as aesthetic in nature. This is done through an analysis of 
language, a central concern for Zen Buddhism. The thesis develops two modes of language at 
work in Zen: representational and indexical. What these modes of language entail, the kind of 
relations that are developed through their use, are explored with recourse to a variety of Zen 
platforms: poetry, the koan, zazen, music, and suizen. In doing so, a primacy of listening is 
found in Zen-a listening without a listener. Given this primacy of listening, silence comes to 
the forefront of the investigation. An analysis of John Cage's 4'33" provides this thesis with 
justification of the groundlessness of silence, and the groundlessness of subjectivity. 
Listening allows for the abyssal subject to emerges, which in tum allows for reality to present 
itself outside of the constitutive function of language. 
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Introduction 
This thesis attempts to present Zen experience as aesthetic experience. What we mean by 
"aesthetic experience", is not tied to the experience of beauty or the sublime, but to the 
experience of reality proper. This may seem odd from a Western perspective, as we are keen 
to think that we experience reality proper in all of our daily encounters, and that aesthetics, 
and aesthetic experience, involves a lifting up to a higher level, or order, of experience. To 
understand what aesthetic experience is from the Zen perspective, we must first understand 
what is involved in the experience of reality proper. For Zen, and Japanese culture, nature is 
reality proper, i.e. natural experience. To say more about the kind of experience aesthetic 
experience is, we can look at what presents itself in natural experience. When we gaze upon 
the world with the dharma-eye, the impermanence, and mystery of existence presents itself. 
We experience change, and wonder, at the inner workings of the world. Further, 
impermanence, and mystery, present themselves as the fundamental conditions of existence. 
Aesthetic, or natural experience, what Nishida would call "pure experience", is experiencing 
impermanence, and mystery. For Zen, and Japanese culture, these fundamental conditions of 
existence are neither negative, nor nihilistic. We must then ask: how is it that these 
fundamental conditions of experience are lost, or covered up, in our everyday experience. 
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This will be done through the analysis of language and silence in Zen. Many scholarly works 
on Zen include a discussion of language, as it is a central theme in Zen Buddhism; however, 
there is little explicit analysis of the Zen position. A critical analysis of language and its 
different uses in Zen has not been developed. How does the Zen theory of language relate to 
fundamental Buddhist doctrines such as impermanence and the doctrine of no-self? If Zen is 
so critical of language, why do they use it? In answering this question, we identify two modes 
of language in the Zen approach to the linguistic domain. The first, we call "representational", 
about which Zen holds a negative position in that it perpetuates samsara and samsaric 
!lnderstanding. The second, we call "indexical", which we will suggest is positive, from the 
Zen perspective, as it allows for the presentation of suchness (tathata), which is how reality is 
naturally. Through the analysis of these two modes of language, we discover that indexical 
language is primarily an aesthetic medium in which its function is not to explain and enframe, 
but rather to point directly (index) to the signified, which in the Buddhist context is suchness. 
Here, the signified speaks for itself, and is not mediated by representation. 
In this thesis, we will argue that representational language is synonymous with avidya. 
This is perhaps controversial. In the Buddhist chain of causality, pratitya samutpada, there is 
no analysis of what causes avidya. It is considered to be primordial. By suggesting that 
representational language veils reality, we can speculate why this is the case based on how 
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this mode of language functions. Based on the critical analysis provided, we make a case for 
the claim that representational language is avidya. Although Early Buddhism would be 
allergic, or critical of this inquiry, as it is speculative, Zen allows us to cast a critical eye on 
this issue. In suggesting this, we provide a way to remove avidya through a different mode of 
language that does not veil reality, which we term "indexical". 
In indexical language, there is, we argue, an emphasis on listening, which goes beyond 
merely auditory awareness/cognition. Further, through an analysis of silence, we conclude 
that silence is something to be listened to, and in light of this, we suggest that there is a 
primacy of listening in Zen. This is found in Zen practices such as the koan, zazen mediation, 
the musical practice of the shakuhachi, and the musical meditation called suizen. Through 
listening, not only is avidya (ignorance) overcome, but it is also through listening that a non-
ego logical position of subjectivity, what we call the "abyssal subject", arises. To this abyssal 
subject, the world gives itself in its naturalness, and it experiences the non-dual reality, freed 
from the confines that language places on it. The abyssal subject sees without a seer, and 
listens without a listener. 
Two assumptions must be made here, otherwise this project does not get off the ground. 
The first is that Zen, and Buddhism as a whole, is nirvana-centric, that is, engaging in 
Buddhist practice is to be engaged in the eradication of dukkha. The second is that Zen's 
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return to Bodhidharma as the foundational figure, with his dictum "without relying on words 
and writings" 1, is of vital significance. Consequently, our emphasis on language is an 
essentially correct appropriation of Zen discourse. Zen assumes that there is a naturalness of 
existence, one that is creative and spontaneous, and which is veiled, or lost, in the fog of 
samsara. Concepts like "pure experience" allow Zennists and philosophers like Kitaro 
Nishida to develop an account of the kind of experience which is intended by terms like 
satori. From the Zen perspective, we have seen that the natural is tied to aesthetic experience, 
which presents the fundamental conditions of existence. 
Given what has been said, our project seems to be speculative in approach. To this 
suggestion, there is no real defence other than it is also critical, even if our conclusions are 
speculative. Claims are not just being thrown around and accepted. Rather they are thought 
out, thought through, and given a fair assessment before building on what has been claimed. 
The argument in this thesis, while being speculative in large part, is still a work of critical 
philosophy. 
This thesis has four chapters. The first chapter, Language and Reality, is preliminary in 
scope. It seeks to demonstrate the relationship between language and experience, and 
language and our understanding of our experience. Through this discussion, we identify the 
1 Bodhidharma, "The Two Paths" in Zen Sourcebook: Traditional Documents from China, Korea and Japan, 
edited by StephanAddiss, Stanley Lambardo and Judith Roitman (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
Inc., 2008), 10. 
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two modes of language, the representational and indexical, and their relevance to Zen 
practice. 
The second chapter, Representational Language: Its Use and Function, will discuss the 
first mode. It will show that representational language is a mode of language which privileges 
permanency and, through this, gives way to a conceptual and "comparative" approach to the 
world. We suggest that representational language perpetuates samsara by constructing reality 
in its own image, a conceptual "reality". In doing so, we will see how representational 
language creates the ego, the locus of craving and dukkha. 
In the third chapter, Indexical Language: Its Use and Function, we will show how 
indexical language is aesthetic in character. Furthermore, indexical language is a mode of 
language that negates itself. Instead, the function of indexical language is to point straight to 
the source, unmediated through language. The division between representational and 
indexical is not between thought, and concepts, versus, feelings, and emotions. Indexical 
language is stricto sensu an index, a pointing. It is not involve in the medium of reference. 
Further it is neither the case of a distinction between adequate or inadequate correspondence, 
but the limination inherent in all representation. Indexical language privileges impermanency, 
hence, the Japanese aesthetic concept of yugen (mystery and darkness) plays a primary role. 
Through the function of pointing, indexical language presents the "groundlessness" of reality, 
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and the self. The abyssal subject emerges from the use of indexical language and displaces 
the egological framework. 
In the final chapter, Silence, Sound, and a Return to Nature, our goal is to show the 
relationship between indexical language and silence. Through silence, we arrive at what we 
call the primacy of listening in Zen. It is by listening to the world that the abyssal subject can 
be attuned with nature, i.e., suchness. By considering John Cage's 4' 33 ", we show that 
silence is a positive force, and not a mere lack or absence of sound. In so much as silence is 
interwoven with the sonorous, and given that the "pure" sonorous has no semantic content, 
pur attention will shift toward musical experience as a kind of Zen experience par excellence. 
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Chapter 1: Language and Reality 
In the study of Zen, we encounter a kind of hostility towards language, philosophical 
discourse and intellectualization. Zen writings are filled with phrases such as, "The more you 
think and talk, the more you lose the Way. Cut off all thinking, and pass freely anywhere.,,2 
In Huang-po's Transmission of Mind, we hear, "How can you even hope to approach truth 
through words?,,3 These statements allow us a glimpse at this hostility, but it is still rather 
vague and potentially misleading as to what the Zen masters are promoting by cutting off 
thought. At first glance, it appears that Seng-ts'an is telling us that the Way is lost when we 
think. But is thinking not what makes us a distinct species and actually allows us to reflect on 
our condition as human beings? This tension is something D.T. Suzuki, his followers and 
other commentators hoped to clarify. This seemingly negative stance that appears in the Zen 
literature led many to consider Zen amoral, a reduction of human beings to their natural, 
animalistic drives, as well as anti-intellectual, that thought, broadly understood, was to be 
removed as it is an impediment to the Way.4 Suzuki's followers maintained that both these 
2 Seng-ts'an, "Trust in Mind" in Zen Sourcebook: Traditional Documents from China, Korea and Japan, ed. 
Stephan Addiss, Stanley Lambardo and Judith Roitman (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 2008), 
15. 
3 Huang-po, "Transmission of Mind" in Zen Sourcebook: Traditional Documents from China, Korea and Japan, 
edited by Stephan Addiss, Stanley Lambardo and Judith Roitman (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
Inc., 2008), 42. 
4 D.T. Suzuki, Introduction to Zen Buddhism (New York: Grove Press, 1964),8. 
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claims have nothing to do with Zen.5 
The teachings of the historical Buddha that the Zen masters emphasize, as being early 
shades of Zen, stern from the Flower Sermon with its silent teaching.6 What differentiates the 
various streams of Buddhism is their interpretation of these early works. The shift to 
Mahayana from Hinayana Buddhism comes about through a disagreement on the role of the 
sunyata (it is not just the selfthat is empty, but the world or dharmas too), the non-duality of 
nirvana and sam sara, and the switch from the arhat in favour of the bodhisattva (the ethical 
tum of compassion). It is usually said that the arhat is selfishly concerned with attaining 
.enlightenment, while the bodhisattva aims to bring enlightenment for all. As the second ofthe 
bodhisattva vows states, "However innumerable sentient beings are, I vow to save them.,,7 If 
this is what splits Mahayana from Hinayana, we can also distinguish what separates Zen from 
other schools of Mahayana Buddhism. While Zen maintains these fundamental aspects of 
Mahayana, we can say that Zen places emphasis on the attainment of nirvana, or satori, alone. 
This, at the very least, is the position that D.T. Suzuki takes. Recently, however, scholars have 
questioned the legitimacy of this statement, claiming that Suzuki negates the entire historical 
5 This is something that all commentary on Zen grapples with: How to deal with the 'problem' of language. You 
might go as far to say that Zen is inherently involved in an analysis of language based on placing their roots with 
Bodhidharma 
6 It is necessary for any stream of Buddhism to trace their lineage to the early sutras and sermons, for otherwise 
they would be considered something other than Buddhist. 
7 Zen Sourcebook: Traditional Documents from China, Korea and Japan, edited by Stephan Addiss, Stanley 
Lambardo and Judith Roitman (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2008), xxxi. 
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development of Zen with an agenda to prove the superiority of Buddhist eschatology over 
that of Christianity.8 The controversy whether or not satori is what Zen is in essence will not 
detain us here. As opposed to providing an 'objective interpretation' of what the truth of Zen 
is, let us follow along with D.T. Suzuki's analysis. While the criticism against D.T. Suzuki's 
Orientalism9 may be justified, the claims regarding a misappropriation of the 'essence' of 
Zen fail to be coherent with the praxis of Zen and Buddhism as a whole, both of which seem 
to be nirvana-centric. Ifwe say that the 'goal' of Buddhism is nirvana, then Suzuki's claim is 
not only accurate, but suggesting anything else would be a misappropriation of what 
.Buddhism and Zen aim to accomplish. 
To be on the Way is to achieve satori and to be free from the fetters of samsara. To be on 
the Way is to be in a natural state, in harmony with nature.10 This tum away from samsara 
requires us to consider how it is that we view, and correspondingly, understand reality. Zen 
seeks to transform how we relate to the world, which, in essence, is a self-transformation. In 
other words, Zen seeks to understand how we relate to ourselves. In order to transform how 
we relate to the world, we must first understand the world differently. Zen holds that it is 
through language we understand reality. Things in the world and our understanding of them 
8 Bernard Faure, Chan insights and oversights: an epistemological critique of the Chan tradition (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1993),4. 
9 Ibid; 53. 
10 This is the clear Daoist influence that the school has on Zen and its development. 
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become meaningful through language. Their meaning and significance is the product of a 
particular historical language. Usefulness is derived from its meaning which integrates them 
into day to day practice. The term "historical" emphasizes the temporal element of a 
particular formation, or structure of reality or contingency and relativity. Things have 
different meanings, at different times, for different people, and cultures. 
As with any philosophical question about something, this already presupposes that we 
know what the something is. What becomes even more problematic is that when we ask 
"what is language?" we are not only assuming an understanding of what language is, but even 
!TIore paradoxical is the fact that we are already using language as the medium for the inquiry 
into this question. I I This brings us to an even larger question: what is the relationship 
between language and thought? This question presents itself as the quintessential question of 
philosophy, which could be more accurately labeled the philosophical question, from which 
arguably, all other philosophical investigation stems. That being said, this thesis will be 
unable and unequipped to handle such a vast undertaking. We are interested instead in a 
question derived from the question: what is the relationship between language and 
experience? "If language always seems to presuppose itself, if we cannot assign it a non-
linguistic point of departure, it is because language does not operate between something seen 
11 We are going to suggest in the coming pages that with recourse to this fact, language is always working 
within its own rules determined by its own structure. 
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(or felt) and something said, but always goes from saying to saying.,,12 In so much as 
language presupposes itself, we arrive at an important observation. Thought and language 
cannot be separated from one another. Thought is identical with language and language is 
identical with thought. The two are so tightly enmeshed that they can arguably act as 
synonyms for one another. Without language, there is no thought, and without thought, there 
is no language. It is necessary for the development of the argument that this fact should be 
kept in mind. In saying that language "goes from saying to saying", Deleuze and Guattari are 
suggesting that the word's meaning is not born from a sense impression, but relationally from 
.word to word. The significance of this is language mediates our experience and constructs, as 
it were, that which we experience. This is what we will later call the languaging of 
experience. 
By thus emphasizing the importance of language in our everyday way in the world, the 
samsaric way in the world, Zen returns to the teachings of the Flower Sermon. There the 
Buddha, instead of giving a lecture on the dharma, came to the monks and did not speak a 
word. After some time, he held up a lotus flower and simply smiled. Confused by the absence 
of a lecture and words, the monks then grappled with what the Buddha was trying to 
demonstrate through this gesture. One monk, Mahakasyapa, upon observing this, 
12 Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia trans. Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998),79. 
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immediately had a satori experience. This is noteworthy as satori here occurred without the 
aid oflanguage. The Buddha did not come forth and say "This is what enlightenment is", and 
then hold up the flower. There was no enframing of what the discourse was about. There was 
no narrative or speech for the monks to follow. In the Flower Sermon, the understanding of 
reality occurs independently of language. Satori occurs because of a clear-seeing into ones 
own nature (kensho), which simultaneously discloses suchness (tathata) or reality. At the 
extinguishing of false views tied to samsaric living, the historically inherited world that we 
inherit and find ourselves thrown into, loosens its hold on us. That is, satori gives birth to our 
natural way in the world which is quite distinct from various contingent, cultural, and 
historical manifestations. 
In the Flower Sermon, we find a silent transmission of the dharma, which is a non-
discursive, direct communication from teacher to student. There was a direct transmission 
from mind to mind, as the Masters like to call it, without the use of language. The 'lecture' 
was without words and yet Mahakasyapa and the Buddha communicated. This suggests to us 
that a different kind of exchange was going on between the Master and student. 
Communication occurred without reference to the communicative function of language. The 
Flower Sermon is considered the foundational sutra for Zen as it demonstrates 
13 
Bodhidhanna's dictum "without relying on words and writings" 13 . A return to our "original 
nature", or "your face before your parents were born" as it is sometimes called, marks a 
turning away from a "conceptual" understanding of reality, as this is always samsaric, bound 
to historical, contingent understanding, towards a way in the world that gives us access to 
experience untainted by samsaric baggage. 14 A conceptual understanding is always a 
linguistic understanding, and as will be shown, language necessarily distorts reality. For Zen, 
the purity of reality, the natural way of things, is pre-linguistic. The reason for suggesting that 
the Zen way is pre-linguistic, and not non-linguistic, is that if it were non-linguistic, we 
.would not be able to speak about it at all. Further, we would not be able to entertain any 
thoughts regarding it. By maintaining that is it pre-linguistic, we can still speak about it, 
though the account of it will not accurately present Zen experience itself. 
According to the Zen masters, the historicity of language, or how words come to expand 
and shrink in scope, is something that is not given adequate attention in our everyday lives. 
Commonly, we take the word (signifier) to be a constant demarcation of the object (signified) 
and its essence. This leads us to the belief that the word has always meant the same thing. We 
are born into a system of signification, a system of pre-established relations between 
13 Bodhidharma, "The Two Paths" in Zen Sourcebook: Traditional Documents from China, Korea and Japan, 
edited by Stephan Addiss, Stanley Lambardo and Judith Roitman (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
Inc., 2008), 10. 
14 This will later be referred to as "pure experience". It is pure as there is no addition to the raw sense datum. 
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signifiers and signifieds, the actual path that the word and its meaning has had to take to get 
to where it is in this "now" remains concealed from us. The problem then lies in the fact that 
if we understand reality only through language and what language signifies changes, then 
how do we really experience reality? Do we really experience the object signified? Are we 
only experiencing what language has mediated and represented and the internal relations of 
language? Words have their own historicity and so does the way we process reality. One must 
look no further than the history of philosophy or linguistics to grasp these epochs in thinking. 
Each historical period, each linguistic period conceives and constructs reality in its own way. 
The world is constructed through the internal relations of the language. 
The advent of philosophy with Socrates was to use reason to find the way reality truly is, 
as a means for guiding normative thinking. In the epoch of medieval philosophy, the most 
significant project was to prove the existence of God, and to determine moral prescriptions 
from that proof. With the Enlightenment, the project shifted away from the primacy of ethics 
to the primacy of knowledge: what can we know about the nature of our existence with 
certainty and how can we use this knowledge to 'enrich' the world? As the 'post-modem' 
epoch started the refutation of Truth took the forefront. As Nietzsche wrote, what "the 
philosopher says about man, however, is at bottom no more than a testimony about the man 
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of a very limited period.,,15 The relationship between our thinking about our condition is 
always limited to 'historical sense'. The point being made is that the very meaning of 
experience changes. That is, the direction of language, the space that it occupies, gives a 
specific meaning to experience and allows for the creation of values. This is very much the 
argument for cultural relativism. My point however is not to argue for cultural relativism, but 
to understand on what claims this relativism is grounded. We are interested in showing how 
language is the determining element of experience. We can present the argument as follows: 
1. Our experience is determined by what can be thought. 
2. What can be thought is tied to what a language can and cannot say. 
Therefore: language is the primary determining element in experience. 
Even though there is this scepticism towards language and discourse, the Zen masters 
themselves wrote a great deal. They wrote commentaries on the sutras, recorded anecdotes, 
journals dictating their experience, and poetry. This hostility we should note, is to the 
samsaric quality that our everyday language has and how it translates into our understanding 
of the world. Language divides and subdivides, forming categories and objects, which shape 
our understanding of reality. The Zen masters maintain that these divisions bind us to a 
specific way of viewing the world. They claim that though language is understood as a means, 
15 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, trans. Marion Faber and Stephen Lehmann (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1986), 13. 
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a medium through which we communicate, it also shapes and dictates the way we experience 
the world and understand this experience. When we sense something, it is conceptualized and 
the conceptualization of experience is the languaging of experience. The descriptions and 
classification of sensations are conceptual markers for what stands in as the sense datum. 
When we sense the object at hand, all of the sense qualities become categorized in a split 
second. Accompanying every sense perception is the conceptual apparatus to tell us what that 
sensation is and what it means. There is always a linguistic framework, a scaffolding on 
experience that constitutes it. It is in this manner that we suggest that it is what is within the 
90nfines of the language that shapes our experience and not, as some would argue, the other 
way around. However, as we have begun to point out, the different space that language 
occupies yields different limitations. 
Let us admit there can be no differentiation and no relation between things without 
language, but Zen maintains that without language we do not end up in a nihilistic vacuum. 
The question of meaning and meaninglessness does not playa role in our natural state.16 One 
can reflect on music where no words are uttered, but the sounds themselves can still do 
something to us. There is no semantic or representational content in many kinds music, but 
the sounds can make us feel a certain way. They can produce kinds of experiential relations. 
16 Though it is not the purpose of this thesis, we would suggest that the problem of nihilism is not a problem 
from the Zen perspective as the question of meaning is already to entrenched in language. 
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That is, the sounds can affect our mood without recourse to concepts. While one can maintain 
that music has its own language, in the sense of rhythmic and harmonic laws, when listening 
to it, we are not translating the raw sound-data into a linguistic framework, there is nothing 
like a speech act that is being constructed in us. Of course, a musician could listen to a piece 
and transcribe it while listening to it, but this does not have to be the case. If someone were to 
ask you "what are you doing right now?", before the utterance could make sense, you would 
have translated each bit of sound to the corresponding word. Only after the sound data was 
translated into words could you understand the question that was being asked of you. 
However, when listening to music, specifically instrumental music or music in a foreign 
language (where the semantic content cannot be translated), certain emotions, even a sense of 
clarity or dread, can be arrived at without being ensnared in the web of semantics. The mood 
that is evoked from the experience can produce a kind of way in the world. Arguably, without 
a representational understanding, there is only be a holistic unfolding of events as they are in 
themselves. This is what the Zen masters attempt to demonstrate. This suggests that there is a 
different kind of 'logic' at work in Zen, a logic not bound to formal logic. 
William Burroughs writes, "language is a virus from outer space" 17, infecting and 
17 William S. Burroughs, Dead City Radio. Fontana Island CD BOOOOOIFYF. 
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destroying us from the inside. A virus is like a pattern that duplicates to all cells cutting off 
rejuvenation. It attaches itself to the cell and for everything that has come in contact with it 
falls under its code, its orders and ordering. Language has rules which must be observed and 
that cannot be broken. What is associated with words-these associations form our 
understanding of the world--dictate the world we experience. Language, the virus, infects 
and transports us away from reality into the infected world of words and their associations. 
You do not get embarrassed from sense impressions alone; you feel embarrassed from the 
language that is said to describe the sense impressions and the scenario the sense perceptions 
find themselves in. The associations of language--the ordering of experience and the order-
word-push us in a certain direction. Language makes us understand the perceptual field in a 
particular manner. Original experience is like a body that has removed the virus from its 
system or has been given the cure. The infection, now that is has been removed, no longer 
holds sway over the body. Languaged experience disappears and pure experience is possible 
only when the virus has been removed. 
There is definitely a positive use for language, or for a mode of language. There are 
different ways to use language. For example, take a textbook on the history of haiku and the 
haiku themselves. When we read a textbook, the language is saying everything. That is, it 
gives an account of the topic at hand. There is always a topic, a theme, a subject matter or an 
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object of its discussion. In the account of the history of haiku, information is given with 
recourse to the haiku themselves, historical documentation and the like, describing elements 
of the historical haiku: themes for a period, tone, and tempo. The textbook might describe the 
themes that Santoka (1882-1940) frequently uses, or his location while writing a specific 
haiku. The textbook might even attempt, to present a reason for writing a certain piece or for 
the words chosen based on a psychological or biographical discussion. Haiku, however, do 
not speak of anything aloud. They silently speak around the language they use. They put forth 
no claim or justification. In fact, the words they use, its language, is only secondary to 
evoking what haiku is pointing to. We can say that language is dynamic and can take on a 
variety of different roles and purposes: language has different modes. These many modes of 
language are conducive to particular ends. There is the mode found commonly in the sciences 
which functions on the axis of truth in an attempt to describe how reality is objectively. This 
is the mode of representational language. There is the mode of language found in poetry 
which functions on the axis of perspective, from the first-person perspective. This is the mode 
we will call the indexical. In the following chapter, we will be discussing the indexical at 
length. Each mode brings with it a particular ontology and epistemology: what kind of beings 
there are (ontology) and how we know them (epistemic justification). Inherently, a problem 
presents itself as one mode holds claims to objective truth while the other stands on the side 
20 
of sUbjectivity. From the position of one, the other is delegitimized as mere myth-that which 
can provide no rational justification. From the other side, the drive for truth is a building of 
limitations on reality. These ideas will be explored in what follows, but, for now, let us hold 
onto the idea that different modes of language, the space in which language occupies, 
produce different worlds and different relations. 
Language is the medium in which the Zen masters present their criticisms, and while 
these could be considered teachings, these words and letters do not contain within them the 
"spirit of Zen" that the student is trying to embody. The question then is: How do the Zen 
masters get out of this apparent circle? They are saying that language binds us to samsaric 
living, but this claim itself uses the very thing that ties us to samsara. The limitations are 
exposed through that which generates and sustains them. What is the Zen view about 
language? Does the charge of anti-intellectualism hold weight? It is clear that they do not 
consider our current, everyday language use fruitful for the task of achieving satori and 
overcoming dukkha. The Zen masters have a negative view of this form of language. The 
Master is not trying to impart knowledge to the student through a set of doctrines and moral 
codes, but rather he tries to get them to experience for themselves, on their own individual 
terms, their original nature and the sunyata of all things. Language can only help in its ability 
to point us back to our original nature. 
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Zen proposes that it is through words, letters, and teachings that we become bound and 
unable to experience reality. Experience is forced into our concepts, or our concepts are 
forced onto our experience. Our concepts limit the possible ways we can experience. 
Changing our concepts and their relations inherently means changing how and what we 
experience. A different categorical schema means a different understanding of the world, but, 
at the same time, a new limit would emerge at the end of the new linguistic apparatus. 
Through this particular mode of language, we are unable to move beyond the paradox it has 
created, we can only experience what language has delineated. In a sense, experience has 
pecome languaged, and by this account attached to samsaric living. This use of language has 
permeated our understanding and our experience of the world. 
Zen in its essence is the art of seeing into the nature of one's own being, and it points the way from 
bondage to freedom. By making us drink right from the fountain of life, it liberates us from all the 
yokes under which we finite beings are usually suffering in this world. We can say that Zen liberates 
all the energies properly and naturally stored in each of us, which are in ordinary circumstances 
cramped and distorted so that they find no adequate channel for activity.18 
This introductory paragraph of Essays in Zen Buddhism I is an encapsulation of what Zen 
aims to do, viz., free us from self-alienation, giving our creative capacity an "adequate 
channel" for expression. Zen seeks to be naturally at home in the world. This adequate 
channel is needed for access to that, where language cannot touch and where it cannot go. In 
this passage, the goal and its fruits are laid out, but the process by which to engage this 
18 D.T. Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism: First Series (New York: Grove Press, 1961), 13. Italics my own. 
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transformation, and why we end up with a false view of reality, have not yet been understood. 
By not relying on teachings and words, the Zen masters emphasize the personal and 
experiential element, the existential tum, that will allow students to see for themselves the 
way out of samsara. The purely theoretical side of the nature of our condition is bracketed in 
order to get at what is important for our practical lives. As Nishitani remarks, the theoretical 
"dissolves the being of individual things.,,19 We are interested in organizing elements of 
experience to provide ease in our daily life, but at the cost of reducing the singularity of 
individual entities into classes of things. Nishitani argues that, with the dissolving of 
singularity comes alienation from within, which is self-alienation. Even ourselves as the 
experiencers become nothing more than a class of things: human. The element of self-
alienation suggests that we are cutting something off from our own existence and, as such, we 
have lost our naturalness; we have become alien. 
The Zen masters tell us that knowing how or why we suffer intellectually is unimportant.2o 
What matters for Zen is the practical issue: how to overcome samsara. This existential focus 
is indicative of the Zen position that nothing is worth more, or of a higher value, than our 
immediate personal engagement with the world as we live it, our own confrontation with our 
existence. We alone have to navigate ourselves through the world. There is nothing that 
19 Keiji Nishitani, On Buddhism, trans. Seisaku Yamamoto and Robert Carter (New York: State University Press 
of New York, 2006), 98. 
20 This is present in Hinayana Buddhism as well with regards to the arrow analogy. 
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teachings and moral prescriptions can do if there has not been an experiential moment for the 
individual. This is what is meant by D.T. Suzuki when he says Zen abandons the whole 
doctrinal foundations of Buddhism by focusing on satori alone. He comments, "No meaning 
is to be sought in the expression itself, but within ourselves, in our own minds, which are 
awakened to the same experience. Therefore when we understand the language of the Zen 
masters, it is the understanding of ourselves and not the sense of the language which reflects 
ideas and not the experienced feelings themselves.,,21 Samsaric language is but one kind of 
comportment towards reality, one that brings about self-alienation. This mode of language 
has reduced us to the level of mere things. The dissolving of singularity into abstractions, and 
the creation of seemingly permanent things, comes forth through representational language. 
We can go as far to say that the mode of representational language is the mode of self-
alienation. Representational language is always an account of nature that has always already 
been bifurcated into subject-object. In other words, the starting point is from the Self, and the 
Self is the cause of suffering for the Buddhists. Samsaric language is tied to the position that 
"self' takes towards reality, bound to the structure of the particular language and its 
grammatical rules. In Zen commentary, we begin to see the soteriological emphasis over 
concerns about knowledge and truth. The purpose has shifted, or was never there from the 
21 Suzuki; 290. 
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start for Zen; the space that language occupies in Zen practice is for removing dukkha. We 
cannot arrive at this through dialectic, but we immediately feel it stirring from within, a need 
to be at home, to be on the Way, to be natural. 
The Zen master is still engaged in representational language when he is writing 
commentaries on the sutras. However, the Zen use of representational languages is negative, 
in that it uses the logic of representation against itself. They show that representational 
understanding and language limit our experiential field by classifying experience into 
arbitrary distinctions. This classification removes the phenomenon's uniqueness, and based 
on its classification, places us under the illusion that these distinctions represent a move 
towards truth. Furthermore, it is by knowing the truth we will not suffer. One of the functions 
of representation is to arrive at the scientific depiction of reality. This movement is built into 
the logic of representation. It would be another type of thinking if it did not attempt to 
quantify reality. However, representational language pushes us away from the concern with 
our own existence . into what Heidegger calls 'the they'. 22 Representational language 
produces samsara. This concern for our own life being abandoned is a stepping stone to our 
self-alienation. Yet, this representational mode is needed for survival. The function of 
ascribing permanency and abstraction was a survival tactic. They helped to guard against the 
22 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper-Collins 
Publishers, 1962), 165. 
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dangers that nature can bring at a moment's notice. However, this organization of reality is 
not for the flourishing of human beings as Nishitani argued. Reality is more than what 
representation can present.23 This is only one way in which reality has been constituted. It 
has been said that what distinguishes us from other animals is our use of a highly elaborate 
linguistic structure-that we are linguistic beings. Additionally, it tells us that we are 
communal beings, as language is a communicative tool. For human beings, communal living 
was necessary for survival as a species. What this suggests is that we need language to live. 
However, representational language is one-dimensional, cutting off something that is 
essential to us, and covering up its source to make it seem as if this were the only way reality 
could appear. 
In Zen practice, language is viewed as functioning indexically, where the words are not 
representing things, but are calling the listener to tum inwardly, to their "original nature" and 
experience for themselves, what the language is pointing to. This direct pointing is to our 
original way in the world, the plane from which all formations of reality stem, which escapes 
language altogether: it is the outside of language. This plane from which all formations of 
reality are born is sunyata. Sunyata, constituted in different ways, with different categories 
and classifications, gives the world differently. However, at the same time, the contingent 
23 This could be called the staring point for Buddhism as a whole. If you do not admit to dukkha then the project 
does not get off the ground. 
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world-views are from sunyata and, in this sense, are from the same "source". It is in this 
sense of going outside of the language, that we can say that the Zen use of indexical language 
is a work of "skillful means", because what is experienced through indexical language is not 
contained within the words uttered or on some understanding of doctrines and properties of 
things, but rather with what is experienced itself. It is what language is unable to grasp. 
Indexical language points to and allows us to experience the sunyata of reality. This is what 
the Heart Sutra seeks to demonstrate in saying "form is emptiness and emptiness is form,,24. 
24 "The Heart Surta" in Zen Sourcebook: Traditional Documents from China, Korea and Japan, edited by 
Stephan Addiss, Stanley Lambardo and Judith Roitman (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2008), 
4. 
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Chapter 2: Representational Language: Use and Function 
There is a Buddhist parable in Mishima's Spring Snow about a monk on a pilgrimage who 
stops to rest in a graveyard when night falls. Thirst awakened the monk from his slumber, and 
while unable to see in the darkness, he was able to locate a small puddle that contained water 
from a recent rainfall. After he drank this, the monk remarked that the water was the purest 
water he had ever tasted. He returned to sleep. When he awoke in the morning, the monk was 
excited to see the glorious puddle that had given him this delightful experience during the 
night. But, the monk found no puddle, only a skull that had accumulated rain water. The 
monk was disgusted by this tum in his understanding and began to vomit.25 This parable tells 
us that, apart from the 'history' of the water, it was the purest water one could imagine. 
Primarily, only thirst, water, and a place were present. There was no concern of the past or for 
the future, only the immediate occurrence was present to give meaning. There was only a 
being-in of the experience. There was no 'world', a totality of things present, only a place in 
which events unfold. However, as a background or a narrative about the water began to form 
and memory entered, a world developed. The role of memory is that it holds previous beliefs 
and associations. There is retention of the world and its linguistic demarcation shapes future 
25 Yukio Mishima, Spring Snow, trans. Alfred A. KnopfInc. (New York: Gulf and Western Corporation, 1972), 
27 -28. 
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experience. Memory serves as the ground for the belief in permanency and consistency. The 
water and what it signified became re-presented through understanding. This resulted in the 
water's "purity" becoming "revolting". The water was judged to be revolting after the 
original encounter with it. That is to say, the water was represented through a conceptual 
framework that language formed. Two options present themselves: it was either that the water 
itself was revolting or it was what was predicated of the water by the language used which 
made the water revolting. As the story unfolds, it highlights that it was the predication of 
qualities to the water that made the monk sick. It was what the water became through the 
l,lIlderstanding, and the language used to understand it, that made it what it was. The original 
encounter saw the water as the purest water to have ever been drunk. This original encounter 
turned into disgust through the addition of further 'information', post-facto to the original 
experience. That is, the plane in which events unfolded was constituted in a particular manner. 
By further analyzing this scenario, it will help us unlock the kind of engagement with the 
world that the Zen masters are arguing against and also how deeply ingrained representational 
language is in our understanding of the world. 
To emphasize this relationship between our use of language and our understanding of the 
world, we tum to Alan Watts, a student ofD.T. Suzuki and Zen teacher. Understanding is the 
processing of experience. While it is easy for us to see how the designation of a word to an 
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object is arbitrary or a matter of convention, saying calling a drum a drum as opposed to a 
book, it is difficult to see how the processing of experience is also a matter of convention. 
Consider the world of a child. 
His culture has tacitly agreed to divide things from each other, to mark out the boundaries within our 
daily experience. Thus scientific convention decides whether an eel shall be a fish or a snake, and 
grammatical convention determines what experiences shall be called objects and what shall be called 
events or actions. How arbitrary such conventions may be can be seen from the question "what 
happens to my fist [noun-object] when I open my hand?" the object miraculously vanishes because an 
action was disguised by a part of speech usually assigned to a thing! 26 
The example of a child is most fitting to show how the use of language dictates and forms the 
way we understand and process experience. That is to say, how we engage the world is 
gependent upon how we understand the world, and this understanding of the world is 
constructed through linguistic and conceptual distinctions. Again, we return to our initial 
position that thinking and language are so tightly intertwined that we cannot separate one 
from the other. The point here is not to suggest epistemological relativism, which is a default 
position, but rather to emphasize how interdependent our inner states and our understanding 
are with our claims about reality. Viewing a drum as an object for striking to produce sound 
will designate a specific function and use for that drum. This can even be extended to suggest 
that our geographical location, factors like climate, will influence how we understand and 
relate to the world. Our understanding of the world is based upon the language we use to 
26 Alan Watts, The Way a/Zen (New York: Vintage Books, 1989),5. 
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describe it. The distinctions and delineations that language has made about the world are, as 
the Zen masters claim, just a matter of "convention". They could have been delineated in 
another manner that would then result in an entirely different way of engaging the world: 
signifiers are contingent. The plane of sunyata could have been conceptualized, layered and 
veiled with concepts, in entirely another manner. This can be further emphasized through 
different cultural and linguistic understandings of what the word 'soul' delineates. In the 
Christian tradition, the word "soul" carries a particular meaning. The soul is understood as 
the eternal life-giving entity that will carry on to Heaven or Hell. The word "soul", is an 
~xtreme example of how our understanding/linguistic designation shapes how we engage and 
live in the world. We cannot ostensibly point to the soul, as it is not a material object. The 
'soul' has only become an object through a linguistic naming and the circulation and 
perpetuation of this name occurs through our religious discourse. This shows us the reifying 
powers of names. Our understanding of the world and how to engage it was a result of what 
this word designated. A system of ethics was developed based on the analytic of the linguistic 
term and what became predicated to it. There is reward for the good and punishment for the 
wicked. A code of conduct concerning how to live was derived from the understanding of this 
linguistic term. In a culture that lacks this word and hence concept, its ethical principles 
would develop very differently. We could suggest from here that, it is not the object of 
31 
experience that is meaningful for a culture, but what the word is said to represent. However, 
we cannot forget that our primordial experience as human beings is inherently the same. Our 
senses work in the same manner. The way the eye reflects light, the way the ear translates 
vibrations; these are primordial ways in which we, as human beings, engage the world. 
Language is what distinguishes and places values on different experiential phenomena. 
Language is culture; not language as different phonetic speech systems, but language as the 
system of relations between signifiers, or culture, broadly understood, is an effect of a given 
mode of language. This is why satori is considered equal or "equalized experience,,27, as it 
allows for contingent formations of reality to break open, allowing for our "original nature" 
to show itself. 
Embedded in the use of language is the idea that the words, however arbitrarily decided, 
truly represent the world of experience. We can say that representation is the mirror model of 
experience and sense perception. The mind functions as a mirror accurately capturing the 
experience. The problem for such a model is that the understandings of sense impressions are 
comprehended through language and that the objects of experience do not carry within them 
their 'essence' in language, as de Saussure has shown.28 When we say representation, or 
27 Steve Heine, Dogen and the Koan Tradition: Two Tales of the Shobogenzo (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1994), 51. 
28 Ferdinand De Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), 
68-69. 
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representational understanding, we mean that the experience is being re-presented through a 
conceptual framework that the language and grammatical structure of the language have 
delineated. If the experience is being represented, this entails that it is being represented to 
someone. That is, representational understanding is necessarily dualistic in that it 
distinguishes between the object being experienced and the subject in whom these things are 
experienced. Experience becomes bifurcated, post-facto, into a world of subjects that 
encounter objects in the world. Hui-neng (638-713) in the Platform Sutra saw the problem 
with the mirror model when reflecting on the stanza of the head instructor. The instructor 
wrote, "mind is like a standing mirror, always try to keep it clean, don't let it gather dust.,,29 
Hui-neng replied with his own stanza, "the mirror doesn't have a stand, our Buddha-nature is 
forever pure, where do you get this dust,,30 The point that Hui-neng is making is that the 
mirror does not reflect sense impressions directly from the world. For that reason, the mirror 
does not stand, the analogy between mirror and mind or thought is inaccurate. The mind, or 
thought, is what bifurcates experience with recourse to the language it uses to understand its 
experience. What is reflected in the 'mirror' has already been through the conceptual 
framework of language. 
Representational language seeks to capture the object of experience and bring it to full-
29 Hui-Neng, The Platform Sutra, trans. Red Pine (Berkeley: Counterpoint, 2006), 6. 
30 Ibid; 8. 
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presence. That is, qualities become predicated to the object of experience. Through this, the 
object is given a distinct area that it occupies and it is confined to this space. Since 
representational language deals in permanency and in abstractions, claims made about 
experience can be weighed against each other. 'Rational' analysis can be developed and 
formal rules of thought can be derived only by making experience into a permanent 
unchanging reality. Laws can be created only from conceptualized experience. Objects have 
been delineated through their predicates and thus revealed in their entirety, or so the logic of 
representation would like us to think. 
What is predicated of the object is represented to the understanding as the whole of the 
object. A careful description is given of the object of experience, and, through this method, 
we can come to know all of what is shown from the object. In the object's creation at the 
hands of the Self, it has been accounted for in its whole. Nothing has escaped, or whatever 
has escaped the constitutive grasp is unknown and unknowable. The object of experience has 
been made intelligible through the confining application of representational linguistic laws, 
such as the rules of formal logic. The differentiation of experience through language becomes 
the subjective point of departure. The simplest form of differentiation would be 'this' and 
'that', or 'me' and 'not-me'. Qualities, classes, and categories-developed through the 
observation of similarities and differences-become predicated to the objects of experience 
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through the representational use of language. This is the product of representational 
thinking's attempt to map out and give a full account of the nature of our condition. It is 
through this that language is taken to be the truth of reality. If we look back at Mishima's 
parable, we can see this taking place through the retrospective understanding of the monk's 
awareness of what he did. He saw the decaying skull with water that he had drunk, and, based 
on the categorization and predication of decaying with death and disgusting, the monk 
retroactively became sick. Prior to this representation of experience, when he was just in the 
experience itself, the water was beautiful because the conceptual framework could not have 
been applied due to the circumstances of sensory deprivation. The water was nourishing to 
the parched monk. Only the primordial experience was present. The lack of illumination, the 
darkness of the night prevented a linguistic and representational framework from being 
applied to the experience. This lack of illumination, the inability of perception-the eye in 
this case, was unavailable for the understanding's conceptual grid to be placed on experience. 
'Things' were not given in their entirety; there was a certain mystery that occurred in the 
plane that broke the monk's everyday understanding. This element of mystery simply refers 
to the unknown, that which has not been subjected to language's constitutive power. We can 
suggest in light of this that primordial or pure experience is what the Zen enterprise suggests 
is free from the binds of samsara. The constructive element that language has in describing 
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experience was absent, and with that its rules for description were surpassed. The 
understanding of what the skull 'is' as predicated in language was absent: there was no skull. 
There was only the occurrence as it unfolded, which is said to be indicative of our Buddha-
nature. 
The objects of experience transform into permanent entities through their linguistic 
designation. Language seeks to freeze the object, to enclose it, so that it remains the same 
each time this thing is experienced. Thomas Kasulis writes, "Thinking includes most of what 
we typically regard as consciousness-that is, any mental activity whereby we explicitly or 
implicitly take a stance toward some object, whether that stance be emotional, judgmental, 
believing, remembering, or assumptive.,,31 When we think, we are taking a positional 
attitude. It is positional in that thinking works relationally between an object and the stance 
which the subject takes towards it, such as a judgment of what the object 'is'. It is through 
thinking, with its recourse to linguistic designation and the rules of formal logic, that the 
object of experience becomes encased, they become languaged. This is so because 
representational language cannot point towards other possible relations with the world or in 
the world. It claims to give a full account of everything. It has forgotten itself; it has forgotten 
about that which allows for the representational enterprise to be undertaken. Everything 
31 T.P. Kasuiis, Zen Action, Zen Person (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1981),73-74. 
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becomes an object and caught in this net; the subject becomes reduced to an object. The 
problem arises not when we attach words to experience to describe it, but when we take the 
words, and their conceptual framework, to hold the meaning as opposed to the experience of 
what the word signifies. It is through this use of language that we are tricked into thinking 
about truth and the objective standpoint. This is just a necessary feature of the 
representational language's conceptual constructions of the plane of sunyata; it obscures its 
flow. 
If objects are permanent, then there is a certain way in which objects are. They are 
permanent, continuous, and have the ability to be formulated as laws. The representational 
account then gets tied to the primacy of knowledge, thereby producing disengagement with 
the world. Investigation takes precedence over the existential element. A spectator of 
experience is brought in who sends us away from our own experience of reality towards what 
language has designated it to be. While it is an individual experience in the sense that the 
reactions to the perceptions are a product of a single historical agent, what these things are is 
dictated through language. When you see a maple tree, you call it a maple tree, but what of 
this maple is like the other maple trees you have seen? Does not language function in a way 
that saturates the experience of that specific maple tree? "We may have a lingering sense of 
having compromised part of our experience [by naming it], but we continue to devise new 
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categories, new names for new things, more distinctions when a moment before there were no 
distinctions.,,32 However, language cannot capture the immediate feeling one has. It can 
produce a report about the feeling. In fact, the Zen masters claim that language is insufficient 
for describing experience as it unfolds. There is always a gap between what is felt in 
experience and what is communicated. As we have suggested, this domination of language, 
by substituting itself for what is real, has cost us access to experience itself. Pure experience 
has been lost and substituted for a languaged experience. It has cost us our own experience. 
"Science has a position that is in a sense, aloof from human beings, for it submits things to 
objective reflection by taking a perspective transcendent to human feeling and desire, and 
tries to know the laws that preside over things.,,33 Science and the scientific approach aim at 
this dehumanized way of engaging the world. Science would claim that human affairs are full 
of emotions, and erroneous claims about the world. For the goal of prediction the human 
element is only a hindrance. Any part that works against the drive for prediction, is to be 
marginalized; it is of no use and only detrimental to 'objectivity'. What is missed in the 
scientific approach of representation is the very human element in which we are submerged. 
As Heidegger states, "Being is an issue,,34 for us, a essential point that scientific inquiry 
32 Ibid; 55. 
33 Nishitani, On Buddhism, trans. Seisaku Yamamoto and Robert Carter (New York: State University Press of 
New York, 2006), 97-98 
34 Heidegger; 32. 
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misses. It has severed our ties with our original nature; representation has alienated us from 
ourselves. The richness and beauty of every individual moment decays, thrown into the 
samsaric ways of the world, keeping us blinded to the emptiness of all things. Kasulis 
demonstrates this saturation of experience at the hands of language, when he discusses his 
first encounter with a philodendron. 
The uniqueness of each of our experiences of the same philodendron (as we walk around it or water it 
through the years) is pushed into the background. The word philodendron becomes a filter on our 
experience, a filter blurring the outlines of each member of the class philodendron so that we can 
focus on the class as a wnole .... [This] distorts the original image. Feeling an occasional sense ofloss, 
we might try to compensate for it by expressing the inadequacy we feel. One might say "Yes, but I 
also know that every philodendron is unique; each is one, in some discernible way, different from all 
the rest." Yet if one is fully honest with oneself, one recognizes something hollow in this attempt. If 
the word philodendron no longer rings true, can the words unique or different be any truer?35 
Even in our attempts to recount this experience to ourselves or others, the uniqueness is 
doomed to failure, because representational language is always abstracting to the larger class 
to which the object belongs, away from the singularity of the particular. The point Kasulis 
makes about qualifying the statement shows us, how deeply removed language is from 
original experience. Language saturates experience by placing any experience into a 
linguistic expression that is said to adequately represent what is experienced. This is the error 
of the mirror model. However, by reflecting on this process we can see how language does 
not function the same way that experience does. To say that one is feeling joy is not the same 
35 Kasulis; 55-56. 
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as actually feeling joyous; the feeling or experience is not something that can be adequately 
captured in a word or a series of words. There is always a gap between what I feel and what 
language says and can say. The immediate feeling (that can have no name for it is not a thing) 
is the experience of sunyata. When language pushes us into the abstract, can my experience 
be said to be truly my own? Is any expression adequate for what I am feeling and the 
immediacy of feeling? The saturation of experience by language has moved us away from 
experiencing the world for ourselves into a languaged experience. It is the "prison house of 
language". Further, there ceases to be a personal experience, as it is moved into the 
experience of the same. Representational language clutches and grasps at experience in an 
attempt to make sense of its world, to organize, to structure it, but always at the expense of 
moving the experiencer further and further away from the experience itself. To combat this, 
another mode of language which can help us regain our "original nature" is needed. 
In representational language and understanding, there is a certain frame for how we can 
think: this is built into its logic. It is so deep-seated that one finds difficulty in even 
comprehending the possibility that there could be any other way. In fact, it would be 
impossible for representational language and thinking to see an alternative because the first 
step is puncturing syllogistic reasoning. Thinking and representation cannot function in this 
way. A is A and A is not-A is a logical impossibility for representation. This is exactly why 
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this framework cannot think outside of the syllogism because an object either is that or it is 
not. Wittgenstein writes in the Tractatus, "the limits of my language mean the limits of my 
world,,36. What is of interest here is not the emphasis Wittgenstein places on the subjective 
side-that my world is limited to the language at my disposal, but that language, and what it 
can say, is the totality of the 'world'. What language can say is the totality of what is. 
However, the "what is" must be able to be referred to, that is, it must be able to be reproduced 
if there is going to be a truth claim made about it. In order for the truth of reality to make 
sense, there must be a way in which it can be measured. This reinforces our claim that the 
world is experienced through language, and because of language's function to enclose 
phenomenon of experience, language inherently distorts reality. Wittgenstein, and the 
Analytic tradition, attempt to develop a science of consciousness. They develop a system of 
continuity under which all objects of experience are subjected. After the science of 
experienced phenomenon was developed, there would be an analysis into the claims made 
about the world, based on the way in which experience must be represented. However, the 
contingency of the categories, as aesthetic experience shows, presents the problem that our 
experience of the world conforms to what the language can say, that we experience language 
and its relations over and above the world. Wittgenstein's claim remains consistent within the 
36 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pearson and B.F. McGuiness (New York: 
Rutledge Classics, 2001), 68. 
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framework of representational language; but this mode is not the only mode of experience. 
The more accurate statement would read, "the limits of representation are the limits of the 
represented world", in as much as language is the instrument through which reality is 
constructed. 
The object in 'full presence' cannot admit anything else, certainly not its opposite for if it 
could, this would suggest that A has not been entirely understood, that it is perhaps otherwise. 
Even in this dialectic, A would cease being A and become not-A. However, it can never admit 
both. Propositional truth can only be A. However, the Zen masters will suggest that it is these 
~trict rules of representational language that block our natural creative impulses and bind us 
to samsara. The creative impulse we have as a feature of our "buddha-nature" is being 
confined. 
We are too much of a slave to the conventional way of thinking, which is dualistic through and 
through. No 'interpretation' is allowed, there takes place no fusing of opposites in our everyday 
logic .... Black in not white, and white is not black. Tiger is tiger, and cat is cat, and they will never be 
one. Water flows, a mountain towers. That is the way things, or ideas go in this universe of the senses 
and syllogisms.37 
We think by means of language, but we have forgotten or cannot think what language is 
based on and how language fails to catch what it is signifying. In our "natural state", we do 
not experience the world in language; the linguistic account is always retrospective, after the 
fact. The monk and the skull attest to this. It is for this reason that the Zen masters are harsh 
37 D.T Suzuki, Essays, 269. Italics my own. 
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towards language because our natural potential does not lie in the use of language as truth-
tool or what language can describe about the experience, but rather with what is itself 
experienced and our personal relationship with these experiences. Pure experience, 
unadulterated, is pre-linguistic, and, forgetting this, we become bound to the words that re-
present experience with its intemallogic of what can and cannot be. In this mode, there is no 
way out for one seeking to recover one's original nature. This is why satori, i.e., acquiring a 
'new'viewpoint,38 is needed to overcome dukkha. Experience does not always have to be 
about the relation of ideas which re-present experience through a conceptual framework; it 
can be experiential in the sense of describing feelings about experience or it can function 
indexically where what is said is only a key to unlocking an experiential element to which the 
language is pointing. Indexical language functions practically, with its emphasis on the 
experience of reality, while representational language functions intellectually with the 
primacy of knowledge and pursuit of truth. The existential emphasis, the Zen masters claim, 
cannot be accomplished within the confines of thinking and representational language. As 
Watts remarks, "so long as the conscious intellect is frantically trying to clutch the world in 
its net of abstractions, and to insist that life be bound and fitted into its rigid categories, the 
mood of Taoism will remain incomprehensible; and the intellect will wear itself OUt.,,39 In 
38 Ibid; 229. 
39 Watts, 19. 
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other words, if the ego logical position is taken towards experience, which must always 
delineate and abstract, we will never be attuned to the way we naturally are in the world. To 
be attuned is to be able to experience without the conceptual grid that language has developed 
and which has seeped through to the entirety of our experience. Attunement resides in the 
shedding of representation, in acquiring a new viewpoint. 
So much has been said about the samsaric character of representational language, but 
what about the Zen masters' use of language? Their critiques also seem to be working 
positionally and also dealing with conceptual abstractions. When the Zen masters say that 
language is the means by which we become bound to a particular mode of experience, they 
are indeed making judgments and delineating what words mean what, resulting in a 
bifurcated understanding of experience. There is a role that representational language plays. It 
functions to stabilize, or attempt to stabilize, into a group understanding, making it so that we 
can plan for the future. There is a need for this type of understanding. It would be foolish to 
call for its abandonment entirely. To help us understand this Zen use of language, we will tum 
again to Kasulis, who distinguishes between the thinking of representation and critique, 
which he calls "not-thinking". 40 "Not-thinking, in its intentional or act aspect, is like certain 
forms of thinking in that it takes a negating, denying, or rejecting attitude ... .the object of not-
40 Mu-shin 
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thinking's intentionality is thinking itself.,,41 What Kasulis is suggesting is that, while not-
thinking is positional (in that it takes a stance toward something), its position is towards 
thinking. Not-thinking seeks to negate thinking and its formulations, or from our reading, this 
negative use of representational language seeks to negate representational language and 
understanding itself by showing its limitations and embedded assumptions. This negative use 
is the work of critique. It is through critique that the Zen masters are able to show that is it 
possible to experience reality in a different manner that is not tied to representation. Not-
thinking is, however, still egological in that its position is towards thinking. In a sense, we are 
still in the realm of the theoretical as the existential element is still absent. It is only by 
stepping outside of this positionality that satori can occur. Sunyata escapes, evades, and 
overflows all representational accounts. Through negation, we are able to see how it could be 
possible to have an experience without the conceptual framework, for it is from this plane 
that intellectualization originated in the first place. It is not that "experience exists because 
there is an individual", but that "an individual exists because there is experience.,,42 In the 
first instance, it appears that the construction of the world is from the first-person perspective 
and while that is half true, the created world corresponds to its linguistic formulation. There 
is still a more fundamental sphere which gives the possibility of that experience in which that 
41 Kasulis, 74. 
42 Masao Abe, introduction to Inquiry into the Good, trans. Masao Abe and Christopher Ives (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1990) 
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individual exists, and his created experience, because there is an experiential field 
indiscriminated by language. The "pure experience is the intuition of facts just as they are and 
that it is devoid of meaning.,,43 Following Nishida, Kasulis calls this without-thinking. It is 
from the raw sense datum of without-thinking that thinking and representation are able to 
take shape. Without-thinking "is distinct from thinking and not-thinking precisely in its 
assuming no intentional attitude whatsoever: it neither affirms nor denies, accepts nor rejects, 
believes nor disbelieves. In fact, it does not objectify either implicitly or explicitly.,,44 It 
would be in the state of without-thinking that all of our creative impulses and spontaneity 
would be allowed to flourish because it is prior to the retrospective bifurcation of experience: 
things are as they are without the adulteration of language. In without-thinking, there is a lack 
of conceptualization, and thereby without-thinking lacks its limits. The experiential field is 
open. However, language is not sufficient to get us to experience this pre-linguistic original 
experience. In fact, as Eugene Herrigel suggests, "the mysterious happening can only be 
hinted at, but the core of it will be missed. All images and comparisons stem from other 
levels of experience.,,45 This experience itself cannot be comprehended through language, nor 
can it be conceptualized. The most that we can hope for from language is that it can point us 
43 Kitaro Nishida, Inquiry into the Good, trans. Masao Abe and Christopher Ives (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1990), 8. 
44 Kasulis,74-75. 
45 Eugen Herrigel, The Method a/Zen, edited by Hermann Tausend, trans. R.F.C. Hull (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1974), 106. 
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back to the original experience, send us back, as it were, dissolving the historically 
constituted reality to our original nature. In other words, the positive use of language is 
instrumental, functioning like an index, where it is not the words themselves that convey the 
message, but the experiential element that the words provoke that send us to experience 
ourselves that will ultimately bring us into an attunement with nature. This positive use of 
language and understanding we will refer to as indexical. It is through Nishida's discussion of 
pure experience that we find the grounds for suggesting that Zen aims to arrive at this pure 
experience, free from the binds of samsara. It is the linguistically pure plane of existence 
where experience has yet to be defiled. Our discussion will follow by looking at the positive 
use of the indexical mode of language in Zen. 
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Chapter 3: Indexical Language: Use and Function 
The idea of the Masters is to show the way where the truth of Zen is to be experienced, but not in and 
through the language which they use and which we all use, as a means of communicating ideas. 
Language, in case they resort to words, serves as an expression of feeling or moods or inner states, but 
not of ideas, and therefore it becomes entirely incomprehensible when we search its meaning in the 
words of the Masters as embodying ideas. Of course, words are not to be altogether disregarded, 
inasmuch as they correspond to the feelings or experiences.46 
Wary of the effect that language has on our understanding of the world, the Zen Masters set 
out to negotiate the problems posed by linguistic representation. The key for them is this state 
of "without-thinking" and "no-mind". How can this be achieved without falling into the web 
of representational accounts of experience? It is by emphasizing the experience itself that one 
can remove experience from the chains of language. The best that can be achieved through 
language is to set the stage, to create the conditions for this "personal" experience to occur. 
Indexical language will present something, say, the description of Lake Asuka, as in 
Akahito's famous haiku. It will point the way to, instead of dictating, attunement with our 
original nature. In so much as indexical language presents and points, the representational 
component or layer is negated. Descriptions are not judgment or assertions; they do not 
function in the manner of 'this is x'. Descriptions, ideally, allow for the experience to be had 
on an individual basis that is free from the enframing of language. Indexical language itself 
46 D.T. Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism: First Series (New York: Grove Press, 1961),289. 
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works indirectly by calling us back to a "without-thinking" state, that is, the signifier gets 
thrown aside, opening the possibility of a pre-linguistic experience. The indexical is a mode 
of language that negates itself. It leads and points away from samsara and samsaric 
formulations of experience that occur within language and points the way back to the original 
non-dual experience. There is a certain rational gap, a-rational element, which sends us 
toward this intended direction. It is a-rational in that it is prior to the dichotomy of rationality 
and irrationality. Zen anecdotes function in this indexical manner. When the Master tells the 
two monks, one who had been to the monastery before and the other who had not, to "go 
have some tea", the Master does not mean to suggest that tea drinking is an activity 
inherently filled with Zen.47 However, the Master is indexing the way of Zen. The teaching is 
not in the words themselves. If there is to be a teaching in them, it is through their negation 
and that towards which they point. When Chu-chih cut off his student's finger, who 
subsequently had a satori experience, Chu-chih was not attempting to punish him for 
mimicry.48 This event did point the student back to his original nature. The loss of the 
student's finger was not the message. The message was in what the chopped finger pointed to. 
We already explored the representational use of language in the previous chapter against 
47 Chao-Chou, "Recorded Sayings" in Zen Sourcebook: Traditional Documents from China, Korea and Japan, 
edited by Stephan Addiss, Stanley Lambardo and Judith Roitman (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
Inc., 2008), 82. 
48 Wu-man, "Wumenkuan" in Zen Sourcebook: Traditional Documents from China, Korea and Japan, edited by 
Stephan Addiss, Stanley Lambardo and Judith Roitman (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2008), 
90. 
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which the Zen Masters are revolting in Zen practice. Language is not used as a marker or sign 
of reality, but as a token which pushes us back to our primordial way in the world, unfiltered 
through the conceptual grid that forms our everyday experience. Indexical language, in that it 
is still language, does not put forth any claims (although it seems to). It is a language that 
negates its very presence as a medium and points directly to the source. By pointing directly 
to the experience, indexical language seeks to break from working from "saying to saying". 
Indexical language has the dual purpose of tearing away false formations foisted on reality 
and of pushing us towards pure experience. 
In the Zen canon, the aesthetic way of life is encountered on every other page. Zen 
paintings, calligraphy, poetry, the solitary life, even rock gardens and meditation all have an 
aesthetic quality. The Masters are constantly exhibiting that Zen is found in these artistic 
expressions. The way out of samsara is found through these platforms. This is not to suggest 
that if you simply engage in these activities, you can or will overcome dukkha, but that there 
is something in these artistic expressions that is essential to the way of Zen. The Zen way of 
life is tied to the aesthetic. What these aesthetic platforms do, how they function, will help us 
understand the positive use language can have in Zen Buddhism. Zen takes up forms, and 
transforms them. Style, technique, and imagery all merge to negate representation. 
A famous haiku by Akahito reads: 
The mists rise over 
The still pools atAsuka. 
Memory does not 
Pass away so easily49 
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If one were to approach this haiku in a representational manner, the way a literary critic 
would, we would gather that the mist over a lake passes rather quickly relative to the way that 
memory holds onto its content. We could read it specifically and say that the mist over Asuka 
passes quickly, but what is represented could also be abstracted into a larger class: Asuka 
represents a city in general. The specific city does not matter. By approaching the haiku in 
this manner, we have revealed a piece of 'knowledge', or more accurately, labeled a piece of 
information. The haiku compared two things: mist and memory, to the way in which they 
pass through time. We know, or at least know that from the author's perspective, mist passes 
through time easier than memory. If this is the message, if the content is the message, what 
would be the need for it to be communicated in such an indirect manner? Is the author's 
intent to give us a piece of information? If information were the goal, the haiku should read 
more like our analytical description, one you would find in a textbook. There would be 
nothing aesthetic about the way in which we approached this haiku. For a moment, let us try 
to "feel" what the haiku is showing us. It is as Bruce Lee says to his student in Enter the 
Dragon, "Don't think, feel". Bruce Lee told his student not to get lost looking at the finger 
49 Akahito, in One Hundred Poems From The Japanese, trans. Kenneth Rexroth (New York: New Directions 
Paperbook, 1964),7. 
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that was pointing to the moon. By looking at the finger, you miss what the finger it pointing 
to, in this case, the moon. The immediacy of the event is lost, giving its way to thinking. The 
immediate feeling comes directly from experience, while thinking takes place in the form of 
"comparative awareness" 50, which is a bifurcated experience into the subject/object 
dichotomy. Thinking is away from what is being pointed to, to what is pointing. Do not get 
bogged down in conceptual thought, let what presents itself flow to see what it is pointing at. 
Akahito has presented us with the image of an event. When we read it, the image presents 
itself to us. This is not to suggest that approaching the haiku in a representational way does 
not give us an image, though it most likely will not. Image and representation are not 
polarized. For example, when I say to a friend, "I played the drums, and then I ate a 
sandwich", the image of those actions taking place does not, out of necessity, accompany the 
understanding of what happened. Experience will tell us that sometimes, when we are not 
being particularly attentive and someone recounts a story, we only hear the sound of the voice 
and "translate" those sounds into their corresponding words to distinguish the intended 
meaning. If we are not somewhat enchanted, captivated, by what we are receiving, to paint a 
picture of what was being communicated, the canvas would not come as easily. The 
distinction lies in the next move after the stage has been set. The direction moves away from 
50 Ta-Hui, "Swampland Flowers" in Zen Sourcebook: Traditional Documents from China, Korea and Japan, 
edited by Stephan Addiss, Stanley Lambardo and Judith Roitman (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
Inc., 2008), 123. 
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the actual experience that Akahito had into what the content of the message was. The use of 
language in Zen's aesthetics is meant to evoke a personal and experiential element, something 
not contained within the words themselves or the grammar or syntax. Certainly, there is 
always the opportunity to take the experience in another direction, say toward analysis for 
academic pursuits, but Zen's aesthetic use of language attempts to touch us, to resonate with 
us on a personal level. Conventional meaning does not have this affective component to it. It 
is indifferent to us. What Akahito's language is doing is attempting to trasmit the experience 
he had to the reader. What is transmitted is not that he, Akahito, had watched this mist pass 
quickly over Asuka (while he was lost in some recollection of times past), but the experience 
of that feeling of memory lingering on in the midst of a rapidly changing environment, the 
Buddhist theme of the impermanence of things. He wants us to feel how smoothly the events 
of nature take place, and how rigidly our inner states, like memory, pass through time. 
The question to ask here is why is this primordial or pure experience preferable? 
Following this we would also be right to ask, how does this indexical language give us access 
to pure experience? Ta-Hui, Zen Master of the Sung Dynasty, writes in Swampland Flowers, 
51 ibid. 
That which flows out of one's own breast. . .is one's own beginningless present awareness, 
fundamentally complete of itself. As soon as you arouse a second thought, you fall into comparative 
awareness. Comparative awareness is something gained from external refinements; present awareness 
is something from before your parents were born.51 
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One of the pitfalls of representational language is that it naturally moves to a comparative 
understanding. Akahito's haiku is not intended so that comparative awareness can analytically 
understand the content. The pure experience, experience of the "beginningless present", 
necessarily evades language. The haiku pushes us back to the "beginningless present" where 
we can experience reality as it is without the conceptual distinctions that language pushes us 
toward and imposes on us. It is by this that the Zen Masters maintain that it is not the words 
used or their meaning that is useful for encountering our original face. 
Ultimately for Zen, words are meaningless and unable to capture reality. What 'captures' 
reality for the Zennists are these pure experiences of the "beginningless present", experiences 
that are not formed by language, but are from the natural itself "flowing out of one's own 
breast" and are able to escape the enframing of language. The situation is like having never 
seen a philodendron and having a friend describe in detail all of its features. You might be 
able to get the idea of what a philodendron is having never experienced one, but this idea is 
not what a philodendron is. You arrive at a "comparative awareness" by putting this new idea 
against other similar ideas, by comparing and contrasting. 
The Zen Master's analyses of the shortcomings of language alone are not enough to get 
us to our "original face". All that Zen can do "in the way of instruction is to indicate, or to 
suggest, or to show the way so that one's attention may be directed towards the goal. As to 
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attaining the goal and taking hold of the thing itself, this must be done by one's own hands."s2 
It is for this reason that such an emphasis is placed on the aesthetic as a perfect medium. It 
can enable the student to see what is being pointed to and to "feel" it with hislher own 
"hands". 
Words, teachings and doctrines alone cannot get the student to the 'other side'. It is 
something that primordial experience alone, when realized as the natural order of things, can 
do. Zen arts are not mimetic: their task is not the representation of mountains, trees, and 
rivers. At their core, Zen aesthetic expressions seek to evoke a response other to its medium, 
~hile, at the same time, mystifying experience so as to avoid absolutizing it. In as much as 
the aesthetic use of language negates itself, that the message is not contained within the 
words used, an objective, absolute, meaning from the meaning is absent. Multiplicity emerges 
from the crumbling of singularity, and by this token the unknown, the mystery presents itself. 
It is in this way that aesthetic media can help facilitate a return back to the "beginningless 
present". 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, "mystery" implies that element of the unknown 
that accompanies phenomena of experience. It is what is unable to be conceptualized and thus 
remains outside of language. There is a mystery of experience, a mystery of what is disclosed 
52 D.T. Suzuki, Introduction to Zen Buddhism (New York: Grove Press, 1964),62. italics my own 
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and what is not. It is from the release of representational language that the mystery presents 
itself. When representational language no longer dictates what the phenomena are, the 
experiential field opens up to reveal its indeterminate nature. This indeterminacy is the 
mystery of experience. The aesthetic non-constituting quality of indexical language relates to 
the Japanese concept of yugen: 
Yu, the first component of the word yugen, usually connotes faintness or shadowy-ness, in the sense that it 
rather negates the self-subsistent solidity of existence, or that it suggests insubstantiality, or more accurately 
the rarefied quality of physical concreteness in the dimension of empirical reality. Gen, the second 
component of the word, means dimness, darkness, or blackness. It is the darkness caused by its depth, that 
is to say, the darkness in the region of unknowable profoundity.53 
This element of "unknowable" mystery comprises yugen. Indexical language functions on the 
axis of yugen, contrary to what we saw with representational language functioning on the axis 
of "truth". Yugen shows reality in its inessence or non-essence, which, for Zen, is the nature 
of reality. Yugen is "fundamentally related to the awareness of existence."s4 This is the 
direction that indexical language takes: it points to the essence of inessence of reality, 
breaking apart any formulations that would lay claim to essences. Yugen is the central idea in 
all Zen art. Heinrich Dumoulin tells us that, "Zen Buddhist ink paintings point to 
transcendence. The multidimensionality suggested by the ink shades and simple strokes 
ranging from hair-thin threads to excessively thick and heavy lines, lets the viewer know that 
53 Toshihiko and Toyo Izutsu, Theory of Beauty in the Classical Aesthetics of Japan (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1981),27. 
54 Ibid; 28. 
. .; 
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all knowledge is but a foreground of something deeper and greater.,,55 Transcendence is a 
problematic concept considering the Mahayana position of the non-duality between nirvana 
and samsara, but the point being made is that through the viewing of the painting, or through 
aesthetic media, the element of yugen is present. This "something deeper and greater" is that 
mysterious quality that our experience latently contains within itself. 
The ability to take us back to our original face, the space that is created which allows for 
us to tum inwards and experience reality for ourselves is how the Zen Masters would 
consider language to be positive. This experiential element, simply put, is an experience that 
~llows itself to be manifest without recourse to different levels of consciousness, for example, 
categorical understanding and comparative awareness. It is what Nishida calls "pure 
experience". The experiential element is that basic, baseline experience before it has been 
objectified, its naturalness; it is the way it is from the "beginningless present". This sounds 
phenomenological in that there is a call for a return to the things themselves, which gives 
birth to the natural way of phenomena. Zen's 'phenomenology' and HusserI's 
phenomenology differ in their attitude to language. While HusserIian phenomenology will 
seek to give an analysis based on the phenomena speaking for themselves, Zen will claim that 
this stage of description has already been constructed with recourse to the ontology inherent 
55 Heinrich Dumoulin, Zen Buddhism: A History, India and China (Indiana: World Wisdom, Inc., 2005), 283. 
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in the working of language. For Zen, nature ("the things themselves") is only given as it is 
when language is removed. That IS, in silence nature presents itself. Once language has 
shaped thoughts about reality, it is no longer nature, it IS languaged experience filtered 
through its categorical distinctions, only a historical and relative disclosure of phenomena. 
Zen aesthetics carries the message of a return to the unobjectified. This is not a necessary 
feature, or a necessary outcome, but in these media the potential to evoke the "beginningless 
present" lies dormant. As Toshihiko and Toyo Izutsu comment, 
the beauty of yugen is faint, delicate, suggestive because it is based on the awareness of 
insubstantiality and delimitation of the human existential field. It is a beauty of spiritual aspiration and 
yearning motivated by the desire to have sensuous images of the non-articulated, non-sensuous reality 
of eternal silence and enigma in the midst of the phenomenal world. 56 
Akahito's poem can bring us back to this ahistorical place. It can connect us with that feature 
of our human condition that gets covered up in everydayness. The aesthetic can help push us 
towards that essential statement of Zen: 
Without relying on words and writings, 
A special transmission outside the scripture 
Pointing directly to the human mind 
Seeing your own nature and become Buddha.57 
The indexical use of language in Zen can be said to make both the signifier and the signified 
inert. In the representational use of language, the signifier is linked to the signified. For 
instance, "pen", as a piece of language, is attached to this material pen I hold in my hands. 
56 Toshihiko and Toyo Izutsu, 28. 
57 Bodhidharma, 10. 
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The meaning is generated from the convention that the word "pen" refers to objects that have 
these pen-qualities. Even if this is but a convention, a [necessary] relationship between the 
word and its object is suggested here. They reinforce each other as being of one and the same 
thing: the object, on the one hand, and the word, on the other. However, for the indexical 
language whatever is being signified from the signifier is beyond signification. There is no 
direct relationship between the experience of the poem and what it is referring to. There is no 
intention of the signifier to correspond to a specific signified. The question of what is being 
signified then yields no consistent answer as there is no object. The nature of the indexical 
language is that it has an unknown signified. What the signifier does "point" to is for the 
listener to tum inwards and see for themselves what is being signified. This is what is meant 
when we say indexical language negates itself. When we read Akahito's poem, we are not all 
called back to the "beginningless present". If there were a direct link between the language 
used and what the Zen Master was trying to impart to the student, then, at the utterance of the 
Zen Master, we would all become emancipated. This would suggest a button could be pressed 
which would take us back to our original nature. As Master Ta-Hui comments, 
All you disciples of Buddha, real mind is not fixed, and real wisdom is not bound. Even if I let these 
two lips go on talking from now till the end of time without break, you still can't depend on another 
person's powers: this is a matter in which each and every person is fully sufficient in his own right. 58 
The emphasis Master Ta-Hui places on the practitioner is because the "beginningless present" 
58 Ta-Hui, 118-119. 
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is not something fixed that can be described and understood like a lecture on cell structure. 
No matter how many sermons and lectures one absorbs in one's life time, our original face 
can only be arrived at through our own efforts. 
A poem of Dogen speaks about how he looks at a peach tree and then experiences 
satori.59 If representation holds true, there must be some correlation between seeing the 
peach tree and the experience of satori. This is not the case, however, as not all visions of 
peach trees induce satori. If the representational account could accurately capture reality as it 
is, then the referent of seeing a peach tree would automatically bring about satori. Even if we 
situate the experience of satori as evoked from words, the same problem would present itself: 
Where are the necessitating grounds for this experience in the relationship between the two? 
When the monk asks Chao-chou if a dog has Buddha-nature and Chao-chou replies "Mu,,60, 
what brings about the experience of satori for the monk? There is no inherent link between 
the linguistic meaning of Mu and satori. The link between the two, for this monk, was that 
the occasion for this reply brought about a confrontation with his original face. This signified 
was entirely accidental, logically speaking, as there is no necessary connection between the 
two. Herein lies the force of Zen: the spontaneous ability to point us towards a truly 
59 Steve Heine, 10 1. 
60 Wu-men, "Wu-men-kuan" in Zen Sourcebook: Traditional Documents from China, Korea and Japan, edited 
by Stephan Addiss, Stanley Lambardo and Judith Roitman (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 
2008),89. 
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individual, and thereby creative, experience that is free from the grips of language and 
historical culture. 
An apt comparison with Zen is the music of John Cage. While Cage's contributions to 
music are highly controversial, his Zen influence is unquestionable. Cage considered himself 
a student of D.T. Suzuki and, during Suzuki's time at Columbia University, Cage even had 
the occasional dinner with him.61 As Cage writes, "What I do, I do not wish blamed on Zen, 
though without my engagement with Zen (attendance at lectures by Alan Watts and D.T. 
Suzuki, reading of the literature) I doubt I would have done what I have done.62 Our purpose 
!s not to say, "Look at the musical compositions of John Cage; here we have what we could 
call 'Zen Music'." Cage himself cautioned against this. What is of interest to us is how the 
music of Cage functions and in what way we can say that his compositions take part in the 
indexical use of language. 
When you first listen to a composition by Cage, you are confronted with something 
unfamiliar in the musical tradition. The melodic element almost disappears in favour of a 
non-traditional rhythmic structure. What presents itself to the ears sounds like an 
amalgamation of 'noise'. In as much as the music is a composition of 'noise', there is no 
place for it to go. When listening to traditional classical music, and even contemporary music, 
61 John Cage, "Composition as Process" in Silence: Lectures and Writings (Connecticut: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1973), 40. 
62 Ibid; xi. 
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there is a certain progression in the composition that is building towards, or taking away, to 
get some place. This is even suggested in labeling parts of musical compositions as 
movements. These forms of music have a te/os. However, when listening to a Cage piece, for 
example, Our Spring Will Come (1943), we are not heading anywhere. 63 This is a 
composition for the prepared piano, where screws, erasers, and bolts are placed in between 
the strings of the piano. We can hear both regular piano tones, as well as prepared tones in 
this composition. What this produces is an "unnatural" piano sound. Sounds-notes-present 
themselves not as components of a melody, notes tied together with other notes, but as the 
notes themselves-sound as sound. A crescendo is only heard as a crescendo when the note is 
retained and laid against the one preceding it. Melody is the function of memory. In a sense, 
we can say that Cage seeks to get to a music without memory. Memory serves as that 
template for present and future experience, or as Deleuze and Guattari write, "memory has a 
punctual organization because every present refers simultaneously to the horizontal line of 
the flow of time, which goes from an old present to the actual present, and the vertical line of 
the order of time, which goes from the present to the past, or to the representation of the old 
present.,,64 As the function of memory is to preserve a certain order of the flow of time, 
memory becomes a dictator of present and future time. What Cage's compositions indicate is 
63 This period in Cage's work is considered to be before his Zen influence, but similar ideas present themselves. 
64 Deleuze and Guattari; 294-295. 
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the primal way we hear, to bring our ears back to their source as the listener of sounds and 
away from the intellectual interpretation of the auditory field. They seek to remove memory, 
by becoming an anti-memory music. 
This discussion of memory and non-sensation as contrasted with sensation was first 
brought up in Plato's Philebus. Without falling into Plato's ontology and epistemology 
relying on the notion of recollection and the distinction between true and false judgments 
about reality, we can follow Plato in distinguishing between that which is sensed (the 
sensation), that which is understood from the sensation, and that what is understood from the 
sensation is derived from non-sensation. "When a man detaches the judgments he has once 
formed and uttered from the impression of sight (or other sense), and, so to say, contemplates 
the images within himself of the old judgments and propositions.,,65 Memory, which is itself 
non-sensation, is the backdrop for future sensations. However, this is not based on sensation, 
it is derived from that which is not sensed. We can suggest for Cage that he is calling for a 
return to the pure sensation of the ear. 
While the tones are unnatural for a piano, they are still tones, viz., sounds which present 
themselves. Cage suggests, "if the word "music" is sacred and reserved for eighteenth and 
nineteenth century instruments, we can substitute a more meaningful term: organization of 
65 Plato, Philebus, trans. A.E. Taylor (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1972), 151. 
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sound.,,66 This more meaningful expression marks a tum back to the origins of 'music': the 
pieces that become a composition when organized. Cage was taking 'musical' expression 
away from the tradition that was submerged in the aesthetic ideal and back toward the organic 
or natural way in which we hear sound prior to its conceptualization. Cage's experiments 
were a reaction to the history of music that suggested compositions signified something. For 
Cage, organizations of sound do not represent anything, in fact, if they did represent 
something, it would be nothing-no-thing-the beginningless present where things have not 
yet been born. These organizations by Cage function in the manner akin to the indexical use 
.oflanguage. They bring us back, indirectly, to sound as sound, 'noise' as 'noise'. 
Performance for Cage takes a peculiarly 'Zen' twist. It is a style he labeled 
"indeterminacy", and, though he did not invent this method of performance, he certainly 
pushed it in new directions with The Music of Changes. The Music of Changes was born out 
of the Chinese classic, the I Ching, which is a series of trigrams and hexagrams depicting 
different elements of existence. Cage had acquired a copy of the text and began to work out a 
composition based from it. He used a modified version of the charts and began throwing 
coins at it to establish the duration of notes, the dynamics of the notes, and the tempo for the 
given composition. Each time The Music of Changes was to be performed, this process would 
66 John Cage, "The Future of Music: Credo" in Silence: Lectures and Writings (Connecticut: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1973),3. 
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be repeated, thus generating an entirely different composition. 
An experimental action is one the outcome of which is not foreseen. Being unforeseen, the action is 
not concerned with its excuse. Like the land, like the air, it needs none. A performance of a 
composition which is indeterminate of its performance is necessarily unique. It cannot be repeated. 
When performed for a second time, the outcome is other than it was. Nothing is therefore 
accomplished by such a performance, since that performance cannot be grasped as an object in time. A 
recording of such a work has no more value than a postcard; it provides a knowledge of something 
that happened, whereas the action was a non-knowledge of something that had not yet happened.67 
One could suggest, given Cage's musical outlook ofretuming to the source of sound, that the 
method of indeterminacy is the method of nature, or, better yet, the non-method of nature. It 
is a non-method, il1 so far as the outcome cannot be predicted. The way of the performance is 
by chance, depends on where the coins end up, and a repeat of the same performance is never 
likely to happen. If you were to stand outside and listen, you would hear the ambient sounds 
of the environment.68 If you were to go stand outside and listen at the very same time the 
next day, you would hear an entirely different set of sounds from the environment. What the 
Music of Changes and the non-method of indeterminacy show us is the naturalness of 
creation. When unbound by traditional formulations and ways of doing things, a creative 
platform is available. 
Indeterminacy is a feature that becomes prominent in Zen. We are told that koans have no 
specific answers. Based on the analysis given thus far, what can be said about the koan? We 
67 John Cage, "Composition as Process" in Silence: Lectures and Writings (Connecticut: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1973),39. 
68 This is an area that Cage explored in his infamous composition 4'33". We will address this piece in the 
coming chapter. 
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know that koans are given to students from the Master as a part of their education. In order 
for students to 'progress' (a more accurate way to put it would be to peel back the layers of 
understanding gained through life) students are to give a response to the anecdote the koan 
posed. Koans often present paradoxical claims for which regular, logical responses cannot 
provide answers. Hakuin's famous koan asks "What is the sound of one hand clapping?,,69 
This paradoxical question asks the student to provide a response to the case which seems to 
have no logical answer. Let's face it; no sound can be made from one hand clapping. The 
sound emerges when the second hand strikes the first hand. The actual act of clapping 
demands the use of two hands. One hand cannot clap or produce a sound when 'clapping'. 
The student, with all of hislher life experience, has no answer to the koan. The emphasis is on 
the word "answer" as this is exactly what the koan neutralizes. Answers are provided to give 
a solution to the problem posed. They are defmite and can be used as a solution to the 
problem. For example, if someone is were to ask, "How do you get the squeak out of a 
door?" You might reply with, "grease the hinge". The answer evaluated the question in a 
logical manner, thought about the possible ways to remedy the problem, mapped out how 
effective the proposed solution would work and then provided the answer. The first striking 
thing about the koan is that there are no answers. A solution, strictly speaking, cannot be 
69 Hakuin, The Essential Teachings o/Zen Master Haukin, trans Norman Waddell (Boston: Shambhala, 1994), 
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found. A question about a greasy hinge can be solved, but the question about the sound of one 
hand clapping has no answer-it is a paradoxical question. 
If you call a bamboo staff a "bamboo staff", you are simply hypostatizing the meaning of the word into a 
separate, self-subsistent substance, falsely articulating Reality as it really is in its limitless openness. If, on 
the contrary, you refuse to admit that it is a bamboo staff, if you say that it is not a bamboo staff, then you 
are going against the fact that Reality here and now is appearing in the phenomenal form of a bamboo 
staff.70 
What koans attempt to do is to cause a disruption in our everyday reasoning. By frustrating 
representational thinking, by backing it into a comer and rendering it ineffective, the student 
is forced to come cup with a new kind of response to the question posed. This disruption 
begins to peel back the layers of conventional experience. The way we have been conditioned 
to think is useless, but, in the midst of the shedding of representation, a new way to think 
opens up, a new way to use language emerges. "The koan is intended to be nourished in those 
recesses of the mind where no logical analysis can ever be reached.,,71 By stripping away 
conceptual thinking, the koan helps to point the student back to the "beginningless present". 
The language of koans have no specific meaning, no signified, while, at the same time, 
signifying a return to the "beginningless present". Koans are only an indexical tool used in 
Zen to disrupt representational thinking so as to get students to experience their "original 
face". 
70 Toshihiko Izutsu, Toward a Philosophy o/Zen Buddhism (Boulder: Prajna Press, 1982), 107. 
71 D.T. Suzuki, Introduction, 77. 
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Once the student has come up with a response to the Master's koan, he will present it to 
him. It is the task of the Zen Master to 'evaluate' how deep the student's understanding is. If 
the Master deems the student's response inadequate, that the student has not broken through 
the filter of representation, the Master might respond in some very unusual ways. Slapping 
and yelling at the student are common practices. These are not punishments, but tools to 
provide a "shock of being", to help jar the student out of the conceptual prison. They are 
exercises in compassion. The student, having thought that he had generated a response to the 
koan, emerges with a kind of confidence, only to be crushed by the grabbing of his nose. This 
humbling erodes the confidence in the analytical method. It is only by producing a uniquely 
individual response that one can 'pass' a koan. It does no good to present another monk's 
response as your own, as this response has not come from within. It was not a response 
generated from your own confrontation with the "beginningless present". The creative plane 
is what generates a response to the question posed. When a response comes from this plane, 
there is no recourse to representational thought. The paradoxical statement is not encountered 
as a paradox. It is a springboard for creativity, free of all mental barricades imposed by 
language and its formal rules. It breaks through the subject-object dichotomy, treading along 
the path that all Buddhas have walked before. 
We arrive at the central problem for all sects of Buddhism: the Self, the cause of dukkha. 
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While other sects maintain that atman, or the self, is the cause of attachment and craving, Zen 
will suggest, yet again, that the self is the creation of the representational use of language and 
of samsara. By moving to the indexical use of language, one can overcome the limits of the 
self, of which craving and attachments are a product. Indexical language is non-egological. 
We have already discussed how representation breeds an egological framework in the 
previous chapter, but what is it about the indexical use that is non-ego logical? 
The first thing that needs to be looked at is the position that the subject takes in indexical 
language. In representational language, the subject stands at the center of experience 
constituting what the object becomes. The object is a product of the enframing by language. 
The chair becomes a chair through what is predicated of it, even the word "chair". These 
predications are for the use of the subject. In this sense, the subject constitutes what the object 
becomes and the kind of relations, or the way it can be engaged, is designated through this 
constitution. However, this constitution never gets to the heart of the matter. To borrow an 
idea from 20th century phenomenology: whenever something presents itself, the other side of 
it becomes invisible. As Heidegger suggests, ''this bearing towards concealing conceals itself 
in the process, letting a forgetfulness of the mystery take precedence and disappearing in 
it.,,72 That which does not present itself is still part of the object; yet, because it is not present, 
72 Martin Heidegger, On the Essence of Truth, in Basic Writings (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Thought, 
2008),131. 
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it escapes the enframing of language. Zen, however, is not concerned with the revealed and 
the concealed of phenomena. The result is that the languaging of the phenomenon is an 
inaccurate interpretation and distortion of what it is. From this perspective, what the object 
becomes, has to be taken as the accurate account of reality; alternatives are rendered 
impossible. 
An objection to this interpretation would be that attachment and craving have to do with, 
not how language divides the world, but rather how the self attempts to bind itself to positive 
psychological factors and to push away negative ones, and thus our emphasis on language is 
misguided. The self seeks positive gratification and seeks to avoid negative, deprived 
responses. These positive intensities do not become what they are through the constitution of 
the self, but are positive intensities in and of themselves. For example, sexual desire is not 
born out of linguistic designation, but rather out of the body-something independent of 
language; desire is not a linguistic phenomenon. This line of thought possesses a relevant 
objection, and we will return to it momentarily. 
First, let us ask if all attachments are causally derived from the body. The idea of 
dependent origination, and the twelve-fold causal link, explain craving as dependent on 
feeling, which is then dependent on contact, which is dependent on the six senses.73 What 
73 Walpola Rahula, What the Buddha Taught (New York: Grove Press, 1974), 53. 
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this means is that craving is not something primordial, as craving is for something, and is 
dependent on other factors, viz. contact and bodily sensations. Now, let us return to the 
question of sexual desire. It seems that sexual desire is born from the body and therefore a 
part of human existence independently of the self's constitution of reality. However, the 
object of sexual desire is solely a product of the self's constitutive activity. What we mean 
here is that the what of sexual desire, the content, is a product of the self. The particulars of 
the desire are produced from the self. For this reason, we can maintain that it is /anguaging 
from which craving ultimately stems. It is the self that is ultimately the cause of suffering. 
But, the self is only a linguistic-conceptual construct. If x is desired, it is because x is valuable. 
However, attaching value to x is a cultural-social phenomenon. It is learned and internalized. 
Hence we are justified in claiming that dukkha arises from language. 
How is it that the indexical use of language breaks the bonds of the ego logical 
constitution of reality? Indexical language is non-ego logical in that the position the subject 
takes within this mode is the position of "nowhere". The subject is not at the centre; it is not 
an actor or agent; it has a non-constituting role. The indexical lets phenomena be, free from 
what language makes of it. As opposed to predicating qualities designated subjects and 
enframing the phenomenon to become an object, the indexical mode allows for phenomena to 
speak for themselves, a true return to "things themselves". 
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This functions in the same manner as what Cage was trying to accomplish in his 
compositions, viz., to let the sounds present themselves as sounds; to let what is present itself 
as it is. It is by refraining from capturing the phenomenon that allows for it to present itself as 
it is. This letting things speak for themselves is non-linguistic. Were it to be put into language, 
it would no longer be in its natural state. Speech would fall silent if we tried to find words for 
it. This does not entail passivity on the part of the subject; in fact, the indexical is active in 
that it actively refrains from attempting to constitute the object. When an indexical utterance 
is made, what is being signified is not contained within the language, it is other to it. In this 
sense, the indexical points to the "beginningless present" where language has yet to 
discriminate the object. The position of the indexical is non-egological in that it pushes the 
individual to experience reality beyond language's enframing. It is prior to the split between 
objects that are encountered by a subject. What the indexical points to is the "suchness" of 
reality, that is, the world as non-constructed through conceptual distinctions. 
Suchness implies the "beginningless present" as reality is in the form of no-thing. 
Suchness contains no predication of its being; suchness is as it is. No reference to either being 
or non-being is made. In as much as it is suchness, there is no languaging of the phenomena. 
From the perspective of suchness, the self is not at the center of reality-all of reality 
becomes decentralized. The non-ego logical function of the indexical use of language brings 
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us back to the "time" when reality was still in its natural formation. When language signifies 
reality, when it becomes constructed, the suchness is appropriated into qualities. The suchness 
which was no-thing takes on a thingly character thereby centralizing the subject who 
formulated reality through language. The self becomes the epicenter of reality, but only in the 
limited way that it can be represented. The freedom of nature is confined in the hands of the 
self and its representational language. 
The constituting element of representation puts man at the center of the world for all is 
known through thought. Hence, an anthropocentric worldview is derived. But Zen would tell 
us that our position, the human, is nothing special which reigns over nature. "A monk asked 
Yun-men, "What is Buddha?" Yun-men replied, "A dried shit-stick.,,74 Even the Buddha is 
nothing more than another part of nature. Trees, mountains, and rivers all have Buddha-nature. 
This does not necessarily mean that they are sentient, but rather that they are all the same 
with regard to their value-even the Buddha. None has a higher authority over another with 
regard to their being. Equal in Buddha-nature is equal in position. Through the 
representational use of language, the user is falsely elevated to a higher status of the 
constituting self. Back at the "beginningless present", we are confronted with suchness where 
all possess Buddha-nature. "All possesses" is potentially misleading as in fact, there is really 
74 Wu-men, "Wu-men-kuan" in Zen Sourcebook: Traditional Documents from China, Korea and Japan, edited 
by Stephan Addiss, Stanley Lambardo and Judith Roitman (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 
2008),100. 
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no differentiation between things; there is a totality-suchness-a world of processes. With 
the representational position, categories and comparison come to the forefront. With 
comparative analysis comes preference for one or the other. Craving and attachment follow 
which is dukkha. 
Seng-Ts'an's poem, Trust in Mind, demonstrates these ideas about the error of the 
constituting self: 
In true Dharma there is no this or that, 
So why blindly. chase desires? 
Using mind to grasp mind, 
Is the original mistake.75 
The error of the understanding is when it takes what has been represented to it, that which 
was constituted, and uses that conceptual apparatus to further investigate the truth of reality. 
The world has already been sliced up into a world of things-"this or that". As Seng-ts'an 
notes, "in true dharma there is no this or that", the truth of reality is prior to its construction 
by the self. This is due to the lack of position that the 'self' takes. When there is no "this or 
that", when the world presents itself as suchness, it is non-ego logical. If we look back at 
Cage's Our Spring Will Come, the composition attempts to present the sounds as they are 
without the self's constitution of it into various musical categories. This indexical 
composition takes away the position the self can take thereby allowing for the sounds to 
75 Seng-Ts'an, "Trust in Mind" in Zen Sourcebook: Traditional Documentsfrom China, Korea and Japan, 
edited by Stephan Addiss, Stanley Lambardo and Judith Roitman (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 
Inc., 2008), 16. 
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present themselves as they are without the self's constitution. It points back to the moment 
prior to ''this or that", the "beginningless present". 
Seng-ts'an continues: 
Nothing here, nothing there, 
But the universe is always before you. 
Infinitely small is infinitely large: 
No boundaries, no difference.76 
Just because the understanding moves to a non-ego logical position, the position of "Just let 
be!"n, does not mean that the world plunges into nihilism. Constituted reality or samsara is 
not the source of all meaning. The world "is always before you"; nature in its naturalness is 
present, meaningful in and of itself. This meaningfulness is different from the dichotomy of 
meaning and meaninglessness which haunts the question of nihilism. An inherently 
ego logical position is presupposed in the distinction between meaningful and meaningless. 
"In true nature, there are no goals or plans,,78. Nature is as it is: independent of the self's 
constitution; independent of what language can say about it. After all, we are just a part ofthe 
"ten thousand things", or as Lao-tzu suggests, we are nothing more than "straw dogs". Goals 
and plans are a product of the self, which manufactures them, mired as it is in 
representational use of language. In the indexical, there is no room for goals or plans to 
manifest themselves, only a pushing of the understanding to encounter reality. As Chao-chou 
76 Ibid; 18. 
77 Ibid; 16. 
78 Ibid; 17. 
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comments, "A monk asked "what are the words of the ancients?" A Master said, "Listen 
carefully! Listen carefully!,,79 Nothing else was said to the monk. What the monk is to listen 
to carefully is nature, when words and the chatter of language cease. It is in nature that one 
will find the words of all the past Masters, all the discourses of the Buddha, all sects, for all 
of Zen can be understood from going back to its source. 
In the indexical use of language, the law of identity, namely, A is A, breaks down 
revealing the limitless possible ways the world is able to manifest itself. This brings us back 
to sunyata, to the plane from which all constitutions of reality stem, although the plane itself 
lies outside the defilement of language. The rules of representation reveal themselves only to 
be a particular slicing up of the world at the hands of the self, based on the position it has 
taken towards the world and towards itself. The laws of 'thinking' now present themselves as 
contingent, relative to the position of seer and seen. 
As was suggested before, representational language is part of a survival technique to deal 
with nature's destructive forces. A technique for dealing with nature was needed to ensure 
survival. However, nature is indeterminate; there is a mystery to its workings. "Everything in 
this or any other world is without intrinsic nature, or any nature that manifests itself. They are 
just empty, as the word "empty" that describes them. If you regard only names as reality, you 
79 Chao-chou, "Recorded Sayings" in Zen Sourcebook: Traditional Documents from China, Korea and Japan, 
edited by Stephan Addiss, Stanley Lambardo and Judith Roitman (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 
Inc., 2008), 78. 
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are making a big mistake. Even if anything exists, it is the act of changing."so What Rinzai is 
alluding to is the indeterminacy of nature. While "intrinsic nature" are indeed words used by 
him, they refer to the essence of things. The formulation of nature with recourse to its essence 
only, as a construct of language, is the "big mistake". The only truth of nature is that it is 
indeterminate. 'Natural' disasters are a testimony to this. Even with preparation and planning 
for them, they come unexpectedly. We are forced to submit to them, that is, we are left to pick 
up from what nature has brought unexpectedly. While the representational language would 
like to map out reality, and thereby control nature, it fails to do so. 
Indexical language does not seek to determine or predict nature. "Just let it be! To the end, 
nothing goes, nothing stays."Sl This non-structure is implicit in the functioning of indexical 
language. The indexical does not speak about things; it points back to phenomena, and allows 
them to "speak". This speech is nothing fixed, it does not stay. Each time the indexical points, 
there is an indeterminacy to it. If there were a fixed essence, there would be no use for the 
index, because representation itself would simply have achieved its goal. However, according 
to Zen, this indeterminacy of reality needs a fluid medium to communicate suchness. This 
would be what we consider the positive use of language in Zen. It was the egological position 
80 Lin-chi, "Lin-chi Record" in Zen Sourcebook: Traditional Documents from China, Korea and Japan, edited 
by Stephan Addiss, Stanley Lambardo and Judith Roitman (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 
2008),49. 
81 Seng-ts'an, "Trust in Mind" in Zen Sourcebook: Traditional Documentsfrom China, Korea and Japan, edited 
by Stephan Addiss, Stanley Lambardo and Judith Roitman (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 
2008),16. 
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of representation that brought in determinacy, but, in the shift away from it, the position of 
the self also disappears. With the indeterminate feature of reality, the ego logical position has 
no place to stand; there is nowhere to ground experience. With the ground removed, a 
positionless, abyssal subject emerges. The non-ego logical position presents itself in the form 
of indeterminacy. A is A, and A is not-A are no longer impossibilities; both at the same time 
and yet neither, formal logic has been dethroned. This does not imply chaos, however, what is 
left is just the indeterminate functioning of nature-neither order nor chaos. The 'essential' 
feature of our existence remains a mystery. Since it is a mystery, it is not really an essence, 
but just indeterminate. Our essence is inessence. As Master Shih-t'ou comments, "I 
respectfully urge you who study the mystery, do not pass your days and nights in vain.,,82 
What we have hoped to demonstrate in this chapter is how indexical language is the key 
to unlocking the kind of communication that takes place in Zen. Through the indexical 
language, we have shown how the aesthetic can allow Zen experience to occur. In the next 
chapter, we will tum our attention to musical experience, with its non-semantic content, to 
show how listening can bring about a shift from representational language to an indexical 
language that will allow for pure experience. 
82 Shih-t'ou, "Harmony of Difference and Equality" in Zen Sourcebook: Traditional Documentsjrom China, 
Korea and Japan, edited by StephanAddiss, Stanley Lambardo and Judith Roitman (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company Inc., 2008), 33. 
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Chapter 4: Silence, Sound and the Return to Nature 
The way of Zen is to be found in silence and where listening is given primacy. This 
chapter aims to show how a return to silence is fertile ground for encountering the 
"beginningless present". It is easy to say "let things be as they are", but what allows for the 
removal of the conceptual grid that has permeated our experiential field? What can really be 
said about silence? It is a phenomenon that appears to be negative in quality. Is silence 
merely the absence of sound, a lack, a vacuous quality or is there something else to it which 
allows us to think of it as something positive? Do we not run the risk of reifying silence? 
These questions will be discussed in this chapter. 
In addressing the concern over what can be said of silence, John Cage's 4 '33" is helpful. 
In this composition, originally for the piano, not a single note is played on the keys. The 
pianist approaches the piano bench, sits down, opens the fall board, and then begins to read 
the sheet music which is comprised of three movements. The pianist follows the written 
music to the end of the piece and then closes the fall board. This "composition of silence" 
challenges our understanding of silence as a lack or as something negative, i.e., a negation of 
the sonorous. During the performance of this piece, while not a note is played on the piano 
keys or strings, many sounds are nevertheless heard-a chair rustles, an audience member 
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coughs, at a nearby window a bird sings. This leads to Cage's famous declaration "there is no 
such thing as silence", which is followed by, "something is always happening that makes a 
sound.,,83 Silence is not a vacuum. Silence is positive in that whatever presents itself does so 
out of'silence'-nature is always giving. Silence is a groundless ground, or "bottomlessness", 
a term borrowed from Nishitani's work Religion and Nothingness. All sounds are sounds of 
silence which is "bottomlessness,,84. The point that Nishitani is trying to make is that the 
phenomena of experience are without a ground, and, in this sense, they are bottomless. We 
mentioned earlier that the "self' disappears, becoming an abyssal subject where the 
distinction between the seer and the seen is superseded. In this same regard, sounds present 
themselves from the non-foundation of silence, from "bottomlessness", revealing no 
substantiality, only suchness. Nishitani writes, "The emptiness of sunyata is not an emptiness 
represented as some "thing" outside of being and other than being. It is not simply an "empty 
nothing", but rather an absolute emptiness, emptied even of these representations of 
emptiness." 85 This "absolute emptiness" is the "bottomlessness". There can be no 
representative quality to sunyata because representation involves a grounding, a 
determination, and sunyata is groundless, just as silence is. 
83 John Cage, "45' for a Speaker" in Silence: Lectures and Writings (Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 
1973), 191. 
84 Keiji Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, trans. Jan Van Bragt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1982),122. 
85 Ibid; 123. 
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To return to Cage, he tells a story about being at Harvard University where he was in an 
anechoic chamber, a sound deprived room where engineers can run tests without the 
interference of extraneous sound waves. Cage said that he "heard two sounds, one high and 
one low. When I described them to the engineer in charge, he informed me that the high one 
was my nervous system in operation, the low one my blood in circulation. Until I die there 
will be sounds. And they will continue following my death.,,86 Even this technological device 
that was intended to remove sound and thereby to create a silent environment, could not 
silence the body. What this demonstrates to us is that, no matter how much effort is made to 
silence the world, it cannot be done. "There is no such thing as silence." We will return to 
Cage momentarily, but fIrst it is important to let silence speak. 
Silence speaks of everything and of no-thing. It would be wrong to suggest that, in silence, 
the world loses its being, that it falls into some abyss of nihilism. Initially, it might seem so, 
but this is only because conceiving silence as a lack is useless. "Silence is the only 
phenomenon today that is "useless". It does not fIt into the world of profIt and utility, it 
simply is. It seems to have no purpose, it cannot be exploited.,,87 It has no use and cannot be 
made into a thing, and thus is seen merely as a lack, a negation which stands outside and 
86 John Cage, "Experimental Music" in Silence: Lectures and Writings (Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 
1973),8. 
87 Max Picard, The World of Silence, trans. Stanley Goodman (Indiana: Gateway Editions Ltd., 1952), 18. 
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destroys all formulations of meaning. Silence cannot be appropriated by the world of 
productivity and it gets cast aside as purely negative. From the standpoint of productivity and 
usefulness, we can only have this vacuous view of silence. What is overlooked here is that it 
is from silence that the construction of the world becomes possible. Silence is not substantial 
and only allows for the presentation of nature, and the presentation of suchness. 
Silence, as Zen speaks about it, confronts us with the "beginningless present". It shows 
reality as it is prior to the construction of it by of the self. Max Picard writes, "there is more 
help and healing in silence than in all the "useful things".,,88 "Help" and "healing" are 
.effective words for Zen and Buddhism as they indicate what the student is trying to 
accomplish: the extinction of dukkha. When the Master asks the student to turn inward to find 
hislher way, and only an internal light can illuminate things, he means that all the "useful 
things" will not be of help here. Medicine, psychiatrists, vacations, and massage chairs will 
provide no help or healing if one has not stepped through the barrier and encountered one's 
"original nature". In silence, in its uselessness, we are confronted with this naturalness. 
Therefore, for Zen, the useless is of supreme importance as it stands outside reality as 
constituted through dukkha. One of many things silence can teach us is patience, and 
mindfulness that is needed to counter this construction of reality. 
88 Ibid; 19. 
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"The song of the cuckoo, urges me to come home. "89 This space of returning home is 
created from the silence that emerges after the song of the cuckoo. It provides a pause in the 
busyness-business-of everyday. In Zen, as in Pali Buddhism, there is an emphasis on 
mindfulness. This is usually presented by way of contrast between the speed of our everyday 
life filled with dukkha and the careful attentive slowness that accompanies the non-ego logical 
position. We do find instances where the Master will demand that the student answer quickly 
the question posed to him. For example, "Call this a short staff and you're entangled. Don't 
call it a short staff and you ignore the fact. You cannot use words. You cannot use words. 
Speak quickly! Speak quickly!,,9o The Zennist will suggest that our everyday life is filled 
with a speediness, and driven by a need for efficiency to accomplish tasks. The speed that 
accompanies the life of suffering is symptomatic of the loss of access to our original nature. 
Things race at us forcing us to follow their lead. The ability to follow ourselves then 
withdraws as the constitution of reality allows for only one way for us to proceed. "Man no 
longer thinks, he has his thinking done for him.',9] The conceptual constraints of samsara, 
and what follows from them, have already been produced in a specific manner. The 
consequences or assumptions of this construction go unseen and unchallenged. They acquire 
89 Wu-men, "Wu-men-kuan" in Zen Sourcebook: Traditional Documentsfrom China, Korea and Japan, edited 
by Stephan Addiss, Stanley Lambardo and Judith Roitman (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 
2008),89. 
90 Ibid; 109. 
91 Picard; 222. 
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an aura of naturalness. What we know is that this ready-made approach to reality only 
perpetuates dukkha. The speed that accompanies the represented world, does not allow space 
for reflection. The mindfulness that the Zen Masters praise is in service of returning to the 
natural, being able to counter the forces of representation. 
In being mindful, a certain kind of carefulness is found, a carefulness that is reflective 
about what is being experienced. In being careful, a concern for what one is doing emerges. 
This does not mean that one becomes focused on enriching oneself or the world, but rather 
that attention is paid toward what one is doing and why. Intentions become fully accessible. 
What Zen is being "careful" about is the constructions of reality through the mechanisms of 
the self, and representational language. While this claim could be considered a function of 
conceptual thinking, and thereby itself representational in nature, we can recall what Kasulis 
labelled "not-thinking", where thinking acts negatively against itself. The point is that in 
being careful, which is a product of mindfulness, the way reality is constituted begins to be 
understood. The apparent naturalness of the samsaric world starts to diminish. Mindfulness 
allows for a receptivity to suchness. 
Mindfulness, especially in Sofo Zen, can be achieved through the practice of zazen. While 
the importance of zazen as a practice for arriving at the "beginningless present" is varied in 
the history of Zen, we can still look at it for what it is attempting to accomplish. Zazen is a 
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seated meditation where the practitioner engages in just sitting (shikantaza). It is a practice 
common throughout the Buddhist world, but it is particularly dominant in the Soto sect of 
Zen. Through this practice of zazen, Dogen tells us, the practitioner is able to break through 
all conceptualizations of reality. He writes, 
Zazen is not "step-by-step" meditation. Rather it is simply the easy and pleasant practice of a Buddha, 
the realization of the Buddha's Wisdom. The Truth appears, there being no delusion. If you understand 
this, you are completely free .... The supreme Law will appear of itself, and you will be free of 
weariness and confusion. At the completion of zazen more your body slowly, and stand up calmly. Do 
not more violently.92 
We get the impression right 'away, when Dogen is talking about zazen, that great care goes 
into the performance of the practice-move slowly and stand up calmly. The delusional 
views that pervade our everyday life fall away through the stilling of thought. Zazen itself is 
the enactment of mindfulness; it is cautious about what is being experienced. Usually our 
thought-process is like a buzzing bee flying from one thought to another in a split second. 
Thought is restless. As soon as thought grasps its object, it moves on to the next connection 
from that thought without rest. The process of thinking works like word association, where 
from each thought encountered another link is provided, and from that link, we move to 
another connection. This rapid succession of thought is what zazen is attempting to overcome. 
Zazen seeks to slow down cognitive processing. Zazen suggests that one should not fight the 
92 Dogen, "Selected Writings" in Zen Sourcebook: Traditional Documents from China, Korea and Japan, edited 
by Stephan Addiss, Stanley Lambardo and Judith Roitman (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 
2008), 142-143. 
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flow of thought; if memories enter, pleasant or painful, let them enter and then let them pass 
on. Do not dwell on them. Having thoughts is natural, but getting bogged down in their 
associations is something entirely different. Zen tells us not to cling to thought: a variation on 
the Buddhist idea that one should not cling to the world of form. By letting thoughts flow 
naturally, entering and passing away, the Masters suggest that this will have a slowing effect 
on the mind. By slowing down the web of thought, the layers of delusion will fall away. 
The ultimate emptiness of the world manifests itself in the silence of zazen; one is 
returned to the source, to the "beginningless present". While Dogen suggests that zazen is not 
a "step-by-step" process, that is, it is not a practice used to remove the deluded conception 
about the world, it is itself the Buddha's wisdom. Just sitting, Dogen says, is being a Buddha. 
The naturalness of being actualizes itself in zazen. Dogen means something similar to what 
Master Chao-chou noted in the Recorded Sayings. "A monk asked, "What is meditation?", 
The Master said, "It is not meditation". The monk said, "Why is it 'not meditation'?", The 
Master said, "It's alive, it's alive.,,93 Zazen is not something other to the world, something 
that transcends the world. It is 'grounded' right here. It is alive just like the world. The 
emphasis that the Master puts on zazen being alive, is in response to the critics of the Sofo 
93 Chao-chou, "Recorded Sayings" in Zen Sourcebook: Traditional Documents from China, Korea and Japan, 
edited by StephanAddiss, Stanley Lambardo and Judith Roitman (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
Inc., 2008), 75. 
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sect who maintain that zazen is far removed from practical living, and that it is a practice for 
a hermit who locks himself away from the world. In fact, Hakuin suggests that zazen should 
be done while standing in the market place, as opposed to a quiet mediation hall.94 Even in 
the market place, a silence can emerge: the silence of no-mind and not-thinking. The purity of 
without-thinking allows for the world to present itself as it is. It is through listening that we 
arrive at the abyssal subject, which Nishida refers to as "seeing without a seer".95 From 
absolute emptiness, the "bottomlessness" of experience, a non-dual seeing, a non-dual 
listening gives suchness, viz., the world in its naturalness. "The things they are in themselves, 
where they are on their own horne ground, just as they are in their suchness, are one with 
emptiness.,,96 The sounds of the market place themselves are the sounds of naturalness, of 
sunyata, and of suchness. "In this world, we eat, we shit, we sleep and we wake up, and after 
all that, all we have to do is die.',97 
Normally our thought process is rather quick, causing a certain carelessness, a neglect for 
what is going on around us-a lack of care for existence, for oneself, for others, and for the 
world. If carefulness is absent, then it is easy to loose oneself in samsara. "Zen is ... knowing 
94 Hakuin, The Essential Teachings o/Zen Master Haukin, trans Norman Waddell (Boston: Shambhala, 1994), 
95 James Heisig, Philosophers o/Nothingness (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 79. 
96 Keiji Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, 123. 
97 Ikkyu Sojun, "Selected Poems" in Zen Sourcebook: Traditional Documents from China, Korea and Japan, 
edited by Stephan Addiss, Stanley Lambardo and Judith Roitman (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
Inc., 2008), 205. 
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thyself. You are a Western philosopher and you know of Socrates' quest. Did you assume Zen 
would be something different?,,98 The path to overcoming dukkha is through "knowing 
thyself', which for the Buddhist is knowing "no-self'. 
What is evident here is a shift in the primacy we accord to the senses. Listening usurps 
the primacy of vision. We assume that "seeing is believing", but what Zen emphasizes is a 
shift towards the primacy of listening. It is by listening to the environment, by listening to the 
world, that one but becomes attuned with nature. Listening, for the Zennists, is the way to the 
natural, the way out of representational language, and finally the way out of dukkha. Zen does 
oot seek to disregard sight or advocate blindness. For Zen, all senses are deceptive since the 
data from the senses is already caught in the web of representation. Sight, however, offers 
only one kind of direction and orientation toward the world. The Zen call for the primacy of 
listening stems from the need to "know oneself'. Listening is not simply auditory awareness, 
it involves mindfulness. True listening is only heard from the abyssal subject who carries 
nothing with him. Listening to what is going on deep inside of thought, listening to the body, 
listening to the world is needed. Listening is caring, and it is by listening that we come to a 
realization, and a realignment with the Way. There is a receptive aspect of listening. When we 
listen, the sonorous comes toward us. In a sense, we open up to the world. There is a non-
98 Kasulis, ix. 
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constitutive element at work with listening. This is in contrast to vision, in that our eyes go 
out and capture the world. Vision gives privilege to objects, as vision is like a camera, 
capturing a static picture of its field. In vision, there is a constitutive element. Listening, on 
the other hand, involves a letting be of what presents itself. 
Attaining the heart 
Of the sutra, 
Are not even the sounds 
Of the bustling marketplace 
The preaching ofthe Dharma?99 
It is the sounds of .the world· which are preaching the Dharma. The world speaks the natural, 
and if attention is paid to it, if we are listening to it, the Way manifests itself. Let us look at an 
example that illustrates how listening produces a kind of slowness that gets carried over in 
our daily life. Say you are walking down a busy city street. Vehicles are passing by, people 
walking by are engaged in conversation, a hom sounds and you hear a loud "Bang!" You stop 
and look towards where the sound came from. What you see is a car crash. The normal 
processing of the world was jarred by this sudden change in the soundscape. The soundscape 
brought about attention. Attention was focussed toward the location of the sound of metal 
crunching. Everyday processes were suddenly suspended by this event, which caused thought 
to slow down. Caution emerged, mindfulness is adopted, a care for beings confronts us. It is 
99 The Zen Poetry of Dagen: Verses from the Mountain of Eternal Peace, ed. by Steve Heine (Boston: Tuttle 
Publishing, 1997), 97. 
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care, in that there is a turning away from the busyness that removes us from ourselves. While 
it is not the sound that causes this inward tum, it gives the platform for which this event can 
take place. It is for this reason that there is a primacy of listening for Zen. 
Hopefully, with listening, the web of representation can be neutralized. Jean-Luc Nancy 
asks, "hasn't philosophy superimposed upon listening, beforehand and of necessity, or else 
substituted for listening, something that might be more on the order of understanding."lOo? 
What Nancy is suggesting is that, through philosophy, or what we have been calling 
representational language, the sonorous becomes a product for the understanding to 
~onceptualize and compare. What is sonorous becomes a product of the understanding, it 
becomes languaged, and is not a "pure" listening. The sonorous has always already been 
overtaken by representation. But "pure" listening, we can postulate, must be prior to the 
understanding of the sonorous. Understanding the content of the sonorous is the function of 
representational language, while listening allows for the sonorous to present itself outside of 
representational limits and those dualisms such as listening and listener, seeing and seer. 
Listening allows for the presentation of suchness, because to listen to nature is to listen 
without a listener. There is no "this" or "that", only the sunyata ofthe sonorous. The abyssal 
subject hears sunyata, the "bottomlessness" of silence from which the sonorous comes forth. 
100 Jean-Luc Nancy, Listening, trans. Charlotte Mandell (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), 1. 
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Now, returning to Cage's 4'33", we will attempt to show that 4'33" functions indexically, 
and it is through listening that the shift in the use of language occurs. While there is much 
debate over whether or not 4 '33" really is a musical composition, or if it can even be 
considered a performance piece, these discussions do not interest us here. These distinctions, 
on which the careers of musicologists are based, make no difference to us, or, more 
importantly, to Zen. "How does the 'piece' work" is our only concern. If we are going to see 
how 4 '33" can be of value for Zen, we must try to see, or listen to, what it is pointing to. 
The idea behind 4'33" was to create a piece of "silence". As we have discussed, there is 
no such thing as "pure" silence, so we must first ask what role do sounds play in the 
performance of 4'33"? When the pianist approaches the bench and begins, what role does the 
audience member coughing or the bird singing through the window have? Are these sounds 
external to the piece; do they not belong to it, acting as an impediment to the silence? If the 
sounds were thought of as an impediment to the silence, then they would be considered 
external to the piece. However, from our earlier discussion, silence is not the absence of 
sound; in fact, silence understood in this way is impossible. Sounds are always present, as we 
saw with the anechoic chamber. This leads us to suggest that the sounds that occur during a 
performance of 4'33" are an essential part of it. The bird singing and the cough are part of the 
performance. If these contingent soundscapes are part of what 4 '33" is, then 4 '33" is never 
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consistent; it is never the same. It is indeterminate and it always allows the natural to present 
itself. 
4 '33" is a piece of indeterminacy; just as nature's processes cannot be determined, 4 '33 ", 
acting as a platform for the soundscape of nature, cannot be either. If 4 '33" were to be 
performed right now, a different soundscape would present itself-perhaps an audience 
member still might cough though it would be an entirely different cough, and if we were 
indoors with no windows, sounds such as the bird's song could not be heard. We do not know 
what we are going to encounter. Nature itself is contingent and mysterious. If you were to a 
performance of Beethoven's 5th, you would hear Beethoven's 5th• If you were to attend a 
performance of Hiromi's Sonicboom, you would hear Hiromi's Sonicboom. While each of 
these performances will undoubtedly take on a character of its own in the way the timpani are 
played in the 5th, or the open 'jam' space during much of Hiromi's Sonicboom where the 
instrumental solos are different each time they are performed, you will still recognize that this 
is the 5th or this is Hiromi's Sonicboom. With 4 '33 ", however, there is no such character or 
essence. Even the performer does not know what will manifest itself. The non-intentional 
element of 4 '33" is worth considering. In the performance of Beethoven's 5th or Hiromi's 
Sonicboom, there is an intention of the performers over and above any intent on the part of 
the composer. The way the timpani are struck, the dynamics of the string section are a product 
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of what the players are trying to express, trying to communicate. When Hiromi extends a 
certain phrase over the bar line, there is an intention to place these notes in that particular way. 
4 '33", however, presents us with non-intention. This is not simply a negation of intention. 
The cough and the bird's song were present but not because of any intention on the part of the 
performer, or even Cage for that matter. The performer is powerless as to what will present 
itself during the performance. He/she is also unable to produce an intentional sound, since the 
sheet music for 4'33" is blank. Arguably, what appears on sheet music is the intention of the 
composer, and the performer has to communicate these very notes, with these dynamics, in 
these rhythmic variations, etc. When the sheet music has no notes, no dynamics and no 
rhythmic structure, the intentions of the composer are absent. The only thing a performer can 
do then is to follow the time signature and allow for what presents itself to present itself. 
4 '33" allows all things; it does not discriminate. It is non-imitative and non-mimetic. 4 '33" 
presents itself as natural, indeterminate, and with neither intention nor teleology, comprising 
of all "ten thousand things". A performance of 4 '33" is an occasion for the audience and the 
performer to return back to the natural and away from the representational understanding of 
reality. 4 '33" points back to the unobjectified. Recall that, "The Master said, "Listen 
carefully! Listen carefully!"lOl All sounds present themselves as they are: the cough as 
101 Chao-chou; 78. 
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sound, the bird's song as sound. 4 '33" calls us to listen, and to listen carefully to what is 
being heard: the natural soundscape, which is the dharma itself. 
Another important function of 4 '33" is the relationship between the audience and the 
performer. This relationship between the two has much to do with intention. When the 
performer presents something with intention, there is a strict division between performer and 
audience members. The performer is presenting the audience with something prepared, 
something intended. The performer is active in the presentation of the piece, while the 
audience members are passive observers taking in what is being sent their way. If a sound 
external to the piece being performed was to enter the auditory field, it would be considered 
other than the composition, as only the intentional elements comprise the composition. All 
other sounds would then be a disruption. But for Zen, the distinction between audience and 
performer, between active and passive, is rejected. There is no longer the distinction between 
audience and performer; the "beginningless present" is given with a non-egological 
position-the position of nowhere. 
4'33" traces the path back to where the laws of thought have not yet been formulated. As 
the sounds present themselves and fall away, their being cannot be captured or thematized. 
The qualities attributed to sounds are a product of other levels of consciousness, namely, 
those we previously called "comparative awareness". Sounds present themselves as 
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becoming, passing through time and then falling away. What this means is that there is no 
identity, only impermanence. The representational act of conceptualization runs into a hurdle 
here. The world opens up and the closed representational account is forced open through the 
return to the "beginningless present". Silence brings back the time before linguistic 
designation. 
We can also think of 4 '33" in terms of zazen. In the slowness of zazen, the layers of 
deluded experience become neutralized. Whatever comes to thought in zazen does so on its 
own accord and then passes away. There is no preference given to some thought over others, 
as they are all equal in Buddha-nature. They are all capable of bringing about satori, not 
because of their content, but because each thought has the ability to send us back to 
experience the "beginningless present". With 4 '33 ", the same function is at work. No sound 
is better than any other sound; they are all equal in their ability to send us back. Whether it is 
a cough, or the sounds of construction, it makes no difference. Thought in zazen manifests 
itself only to fall away, as do the sounds in 4'33 ". 
The primacy of listening can also be found in Fukeshu Zen. Fukeshu is a sect of Rinzai 
Zen which uses music as a form of meditation. 102 Their monks, called the Komuso (monks of 
emptiness), wear basket hats which cover their entire face to symbolize their adherence to the 
102 James Sanford, "Shakuhachi Zen: The Fukeshu and Komuso" Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. 32, No.4 
(Winter, 1977): 412. 
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doctrine of no-self. They substitute for zazen the practice of playing and listening to the 
shakuhachi, a bamboo flute. This Zen practice is called sui zen, or "blowing meditation".J03 
The sounds emitted from the shakuhachi have the same effect as zazen, i.e., to return them 
back to nature.104 As Gerald Groemer notes, in his liner notes to Kifu Mitsuhashi's The Art of 
the Shakuhachi, "the komuso thought of themselves not as mere musicians or entertainers; 
instead they regarded their activity as a form of Zen practice, suizen ("blowing meditation"). 
Their flute was considered not a musical instrument (gakki), but rather a houki, a "tool of 
(Buddhist) law.,,105 The komuso "fathered mottoes like: "religion is music", "the breath of 
the flute is the way to illumination", and "a sermon is said with sounds"J06. Historian, Max 
Deeg, contends that Zen enthusiasts have turned the shakuhachi into a "spiritualized Zen-
instrument" 107, an idea not found in the tradition. Perhaps this is the case. The whole 
controversy over the legitimacy of the Fukeshu is shrouded in uncertainty, but the historical 
accuracy is of little importance for us. We are interested in looking at how the shakuhachi and 
103 Gerald Groemer, Notes to The Art of the Shakuhachi: Vol. 1 by Kifu Mitsuhashi, CD Celestial Harmonies 
B00005Y2F1. 
104 There is a historical dispute over the legitimacy of the Fukeshu, as monks were given free passage through 
different regions in the Tokugawa period, which other members of society were not, particularly the ronin and 
samurai. Since the monks wore the basket hats concealing their identity, it would have been easy for the ronin to 
pass as a Komuso to gain free passage to other regions. 104 
105 Groemer 
106 Akira Tamba, Notes to Shakuhachi: Kinko School by Teruhisa Fukuda, trans. Jeffrey Grice, CD Harmonia 
Mundi Distribution BOOOOCC625. 
107 Max Deeg, "Koumuso and Shakuhachi Zen: Historical Legitimation to the Spiritualization of a Buddhist 
Denomination in the Edo Period" Japanese Religions, Vol. 32 (1&2): 35. 
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the practice of suizen, which is founded on the primacy of listening, can be considered 
indexical. 
When one listens to the kind of sounds that the shakuhachi produces, one feels a kind of 
"lightness". When it is accompanied with other instruments such as the samisen and koto 
drums, the notes of the shakuhachi float above all other sounds in a kind of gentle manner. In 
traditional court music, gagaku, the samisen and the taiko will generally play a busier part, 
more notes, while the shakuhachi creates the feeling that it is lagging behind or acting as the 
anchor to the rest of the accompaniment. Where these other instruments play busier rhythmic 
lines, the shakuhachi is mimicking the flow of water, "which allows for the expression of 
boundless sadness and 10neliness.,,108 It is as if the shakuhachi is taking the role of nature, 
the way it breaths life into the compositions, while, at the same time, the element of yugen is 
present in the way the notes are drawn out and withheld. The shakuhachi also gives an air of 
calmness to the composition that would be lost if it were not present. Like most of Cage's 
compositions, the music of the shakuhachi is predominately rhythmic in nature. The melodic 
element is kept to a minimum while bringing intricate rhythmic patterns to the forefront. By 
being more focused on rhythm, the shakuhachi can shape our experience of time. The kind of 
rhythmic patterns it utilizes can make one who is listening feel time differently. By giving 
108 Groemer. 
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oneself over to the sound, the "time-feel,,109 of the piece can alter our experience of time. 
The sounds have the ability to speed up or slow down the way we experience the world. It is 
in this regard that we can suggest that our lived time is regulated through the act of listening. 
The rhythmic feel of the shakuhachi takes a much slower pace; the shakuhachi is usually 
dragging the time-feel. The spaces between notes, generally considered the silences or, 
properly speaking, the rests, are abundant. The shakuhachi utilizes the silence to create a 
dragging, a slowness in time-feel. Based on the kind of rhythm we hear, the way we relate to 
the world will be altered. Consider some rhythmic structures from Hiromi's Sonicboom. They 
can seemingly speed up our experience oftime through listening. Clearly, the shakuhachi and 
Hiromi's Sonicboom are at opposite ends of the spectrum when it comes to time-feels, but the 
point is that listening, and more importantly rhythm, is central to how we experience time. 
This can be further emphasized with recourse to the heartbeat, our most primal biological 
rhythm. When our heart rate is slow, we tend to be calm and relaxed than if it were beating at 
a faster rate. The primacy of listening begins to make more sense, for listening and our 
experience of time, a product of listening, are indexing the "beginningless present". The 
sonorous from the shakuhachi is the medium for pointing to suchness. In Teruhisa Fukuda's 
109 The term "time-feel" is a prominent concept in the practice and performance of music. Having a good time-
feel is the ability ofthe performer to produce the feeling, or experience, of time in different ways while still in 
the confines of the composition. For example, if a composition is to be played at quarter-note=60bmp, the 
performer can shift the time-feel by what is being played. To make the experience of time feel faster, they could 
play sixteenth-notes, to make the experience have an "odd time-feel" they could play on the up-beats. 
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performance of Kuko-reibo (Spiritual Quest for Vacuity), the commentator Tamba writes that 
the piece is "in fact a kind of programme music depiction of vacuity (sunyata) which 
musicians have a care to evoke in their performances.,,110 Since the sonorous has no semantic 
content in shakuhachi music, it resists being integrated into a representational frame. By this 
token, the sonorous is a perfect tool for indexing, as it necessarily negates itself as a marker 
of meaning, as it has none to begin with. The sonorous can only function as a pointer, and this 
is what Kuko-reibo attempts to accomplish. The sounds of the shakuhachi in this composition 
point to sunyata, and suchness. Listening to the piece is an exercise in suizen. We could also 
say that the sonorous in its purity always and only points to suchness as semantic and 
conceptual content is necessarily absent. Listening, for Zen, implies a non-dual relation, for if 
there is a distinction between the listening and the listener, we will have already moved into a 
representational account of experience and away from the experience itself. 
Returning to the birth of Zen and the Flower Sermon, we can see its importance in light 
of what we have said. The Buddha holds up a flower and Mahakasyapa experiences the 
"beginningless present". What brought about satori was not the flower itself. The flower 
itself did not contain within it the ability to bring about this change. It was what the flower 
was pointing to that brought about Mahakasyapa's satori. The flower was held up in silence 
110 Tamba. 
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and Mahakasyapa listened. The sounds of silence presented themselves in their originality. 
The pre-linguistic experience was made present through the listening to nature, a listening 
without a listener. 
Abe, Masao. 
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